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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will focus on the Mexican Armed Force’s ability to deal with 
existing and future unconventional threats and insurgencies.  The modern 
Mexican Armed Forces are the result of an enduring evolutionary process, which 
has made the necessary changes to deal with the emerging threats against the 
state.  Mexico’s criminal threat has evolved because of 9/11 and because of the 
U.S.-led crackdown on Colombian drug cartels.  Mexico's modern adversary is 
well versed in waging mass media campaigns and uses terrorist tactics to instill 
fear in Mexico’s population.  Mexico’s current threats consist of drug trafficking, 
which has resulted in increased levels of violence and rebel insurgencies that 
have also transitioned from revolutionary nationalists to violent criminals. 
Therefore, to positively counter the rise of social and political violence, 
Mexico's government needs to carefully plan its response to insurgencies.  
Mexico must develop alternate and unconventional remedies to preserve its 
national security.  Current Mexican military strategies rely on the mass 
mobilization of ground and air troops for mainly search and destroy operations.  
Although, the evolving threat warrants an unorthodox military strategy, this thesis 
will only focus on the Mexican Navy’s ability to take the lead in dealing with the 
nation’s rising unconventional threats. 
This thesis uses both the insurgency and counterinsurgency model 
developed by Gordon H. McCormick, known as the “Mystic Diamond,” and 
Information Operations to frame the unconventional state strategy.  This 
analytical tool offers a better understanding of how an insurgency works, as well 
as the interaction and relations among the different actors involved.  The study 
presents an in depth case study of Colombia and the development of Information 
Operation capabilities to support its policies and objectives.  Furthermore, this 
study also presents a concise case study of Mexico and describes how the 
country has managed its challenges without an Information Operations capability. 
 vi
Using McCormick's Model of Counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that 
the development of an Information Operations capability within the Mexican 
Armed Forces will increase operational effectiveness against internal and 
external threats, influence public opinion to support government actions, 
preserve tranquility, and ensure national stability during crises.  States in general 
and Mexico in particular, should continue to use Information Operations and 
Psychological Operations in order to deal with the enemy of tomorrow while 
maintaining popular support. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
Warfare has always sponsored and driven the development of technology.  
Consequently, warfare has evolved and adapted whenever new technologies 
become available.  A significant part of technology is designed to gain insight into 
the intentions of potential adversaries.  Such insight encourages or discourages 
actors before they engage in action.  Diplomatic and military actions are always 
supported by information and intelligence to maximize an edge over adversaries.  
Therefore, the goal for any military -- to defeat an enemy with minimal costs -- 
has resulted in new techniques that ideally deter the enemy from the fight.  
These types of operations are sometimes referred to as “Information Operations.” 
Contemporary United States military doctrine recognizes five components 
of Information Operations: psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception 
(MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and computer 
network operations (CNO).  The PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC are the oldest 
and most traditional of these components; EW and CNO are the result of 
technological developments that date back to World War II.  Additionally, 
efficiency and affordability make this type of operations ideal for insurgencies to 
fight against the state. 
These components have mostly been used by countries that have the 
technological means, resources, and human expertise to use them.  Following 
the Cold War, the United States boasted the largest military organization 
dedicated to Information Operations.  The American need to protect its interests 
and conduct military operations throughout the world against a wide variety of 
potential enemies has caused its military to develop its Information Operations 




this thesis will analyze Information Operations as they relate to Colombia and 
specifically Mexico.  The U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-13 
defines Information Operations: 
As the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer 
network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), 
military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in 
concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and 
automated decision making while protecting our own.1 
This definition encompasses the various U.S. military capabilities and 
essential components to support its military operations.  Each branch of the U.S. 
Armed Forces has its own definition of Information Operations.  The Air Force 
Defense Doctrine, Document 2-5, integrates only three of the five previously 
mentioned components of Information Operations.2  Despite the difference, both 
publications recognize the essential focus of Information Operations: to 
psychologically affect the adversary to reduce the value of his information 
systems and to increase the value of one's own information capabilities.  To 
influence an adversary, every available opportunity must be exhausted to gain 
the information advantage.  Ideally, the winner wins without firing a single shot or 
shedding any blood.  Nevertheless, throughout history Information Operations 
has mostly been used as a tool in support of combat operations or as a combat 
multiplier.  This was the case during the Second World War when the Germans 
used components of Information Operations to conceal their preparations for 
Operation Barbarossa.  To accomplish this, the Germans “launched what they 
themselves called the ‘greatest deception operation in the history of war’ to 
mislead their enemies about their intention to invade Russia, and conceal the 
                                            
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Information Operations: Joint Publication 3-13," 13 February 2006 
[web site]; available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf; Internet; accessed 
9 October 2007, ix. 
2 United States Air Force, "Information Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5," 11 
January 2005 [web site]; available from http://www.doctrine.af.mil/Library/Doctrine/afdd2-5.pdf; 
Internet; accessed 9 October 2007, 51. 
 3
time, direction, and strength of the blow.”3  Afterwards, the Allies took Information 
Operations to an unprecedented level: they designed “Operation Bodyguard” that 
deceived German forces about the landing of allied forces in Normandy.4  Today, 
the development of technology and mass communications has enabled 
Information Operations to broaden and transform warfare in unprecedented 
ways.  The evolution of the information age conflict spectrum is illustrated by 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s proposition.  This now considers Cyberwar and Netwar as 
an integral part of war.5 
This thesis will focus on the psychological operations component of 
Information Operations; specifically, how its establishment within the Mexican 
Navy would influence foreign and domestic public opinion to support government 
actions, preserve tranquility, and to ensure stability during crises.6  Since the 
Mexican Navy is always concerned with optimizing its resources while fulfilling its 
mission, Information Operations could be a useful tool.  The concept of 
information operations that best defines this technique for the purpose of this 
research is the one presented by William M. Darley: 
Information Operations, as the name implies, is an evolutionary 
permutation of operational culture, emphasizing control over 
elements of information rather than so-called kinetic weapons 
systems.  It is essentially a doctrinal paradigm that seeks to 
cohesively link active information measures, both defensive and 
offensive, to enable the operational commander to manipulate 
information activities to achieve objectives.  It appropriately 
includes measures specifically designed to both confuse and 
deceive, and to manipulate, persuade or psychologically coerce 
targeted audiences.7 
                                            
3 Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First 
Century Challenge, 5th ed.(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 81. 
4 Jon Latimer, Deception in War (Woodstock and New York: Overlook Press, 2003), 205. 
5 David Ronfeldt and others, The Zapatista ‘Social Netwar’ in Mexico (Santa Monica: RAND, 
1998), 8. 
6 Unlike in the United States, the Mexican government does not forbid military Psychological 
Operations against the domestic audience. 
7 William M. Darley, Why Public Affairs Is Not Information Operations, Army, Vol. 55, Iss. 1. 
(January 2005), 9. 
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The information age has made technology more readily available to 
anyone who can afford it.  To compensate for their limited resources, some 
actors, who act against the state, have distinguished themselves by their use of 
Information Operations.  This was the case with the Zapatista uprising in the 
southern Mexican state of Chiapas.  Zapatista leadership used the media and the 
internet to gain local and international support for its cause. 
Some sectors of the population are afraid that the use of Information 
Operations by the state will hinder their privacy and endanger democracy.  
However, all Information Operations carried out by the state is governed by law.  
It is necessary for the state and the military to develop Information Operation 
capabilities to dominate the information age battle space. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to examine the principles of Information 
Operations that if properly implemented within the Mexican Navy would enable it 
to improve the way in which the Institution accomplishes its mission and attains 
its objectives.  Mexico's Secretariat of National Defense, which encompasses the 
Army and the Air Force, plays an essential part within the Mexican Armed 
Forces.  However, this research will focus only on the Secretariat of the Navy 
and the Mexican Navy.  The modern Mexican Navy is the result of an 
evolutionary process as a result of dealing with emerging threats and optimizing 
its resources.  Currently, the Mexican Navy does not have a specialized staff 
dedicated to Information Operations.  Although the Mexican Navy has a public 
relations unit, the expanded use of the I.O. principles might prove useful to 





C. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
An Information Operations capability in the Mexican Navy would increase 
operational effectiveness against internal and external threats, influence public 
opinion to support government actions, preserve tranquility, and ensure national 
stability during crises. 
The Mexican Navy’s mission is to employ the nation's naval power against 
Mexico's external and internal threats.  One of the functions of the Mexican Navy 
is to protect the country’s strategic facilities within the Navy’s jurisdiction and 
wherever the president orders.  Another responsibility is to guarantee legal order 
in the Mexican maritime zones by countering terrorism, smuggling, piracy at sea, 
trafficking of people, weapons, and drugs.  To fulfill these responsibilities, the 
Navy’s tasks consist of prevention, deterrence, and sea control.  Information 
Operations can play a significant role in supporting the prevention and 
deterrence aspects of this naval responsibility. 
To explore this hypothesis, the following questions must be answered: 
1. Why does the Mexican Navy not possess an Information 
Operations' capability to support its operations? 
2. Is it desirable for the Mexican Navy to develop an Information 
Operations capability? 
3. What lessons can be learned from Information Operations used in 
other Latin American countries that would benefit the Mexican 
Navy? 
4. What are the principles of Information Operations that, if properly 
implemented within the Mexican Navy, would enable it to improve 
the way in which the Institution accomplishes its mission and 
attains its objectives? 
D. THE MEXICAN AUTHORITIES 
Currently in Mexico, there is no evidence of a direct relationship between 
drug trafficking activities and insurgencies.  However, this is not the case in other 
Latin American countries were drug money is used to fund insurgencies.  The 
most relevant example of this is in Colombia: the Fuerzas Armadas 
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Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
(ELN) initially became involved in narco-trafficking activities by providing 
protection; eventually, they “adopted narco-trafficking themselves, becoming 
stronger financially, and independent of outside support.”8  In Mexico, despite the 
lack of connection between both activities, the Mexican military and police force 
are responsible for countering both as separate entities. 
In 1988, President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado declared drug trafficking a 
threat to national security.  This served as the tipping point for the involvement of 
the military in the fight against drugs.9  Subsequent federal administrations also 
made the fight against drugs a priority for the Mexican government.  As a result, 
the military has increased its cooperation with civil authorities and acquired 
equipment for counter-narcotics operations.  In accordance with the Mexican 
Constitution and the National Security Law,10 military expansion has been 
justified by the need to respond corruption and law-breaking that has undermined 
police authority and credibility.11  As a result of the large amounts of money from 
drug trafficking, government corruption has increased.  According to the 
Corruption Perception Index of 2006 by Transparency International, Mexico was 
ranked seventieth among countries with corruption.  In 2001, it ranked fifty-first.12  
This increase in corruption is indicative of the dire need for the Mexican  
 
 
                                            
8 Myles R. R. Frechette, Colombia and the United States—the Partnership: but What is the 
Endgame? Book online. Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007. Available from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB762.pdf; Internet; accessed 28 May 
2007, 3. 
9 Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt, Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-US Drug Issue in the 
1980s (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), 22. 
10 H. Congreso de la Unión, “Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
[Political Constitution of the United Mexican States],” Article 89, fraction VI [web site]; available 
from http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/1.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 October 2007. 
11 Aleida Ferreyra and Renata Segura, "Examining the military in the local sphere: Colombia 
and Mexico," Latin American Perspectives 27, (March 2000) 18. 
12 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2006,” 24 September 2007 
[web site]; available from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006; 
Internet; accessed 10 October 2007. 
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government to use a holistic and unconventional approach: incorporate 
Information Operations to counter drug trafficking and, indirectly, counter 
government corruption. 
The lack of legitimate economic resources has enabled organized 
criminals to bribe police and other government authorities.  Of course, this leads 
to corruption.  The scale of the illicit trade in drugs, and the related amounts of 
money, was recently unveiled.  On March 16, 2007, the General Attorney’s Office 
and the Mexican Federal Police made the largest confiscation of illegal drug 
earnings in Mexican history: they confiscated over 200 million dollars, 200,000 
euros and 157,500 pesos from a drug-trafficking organization related to 
methamphetamine production in Mexico City.13  Although no government officials 
were directly linked to that drug-trafficking organization, this case clearly 
illustrates the large amounts of money involved in illicit narcotic activities.  As 
Laurie Freeman mentions: 
The drug trade did not create the institutional problems that have 
long plagued Mexico, such as widespread corruption, ineffective 
and abusive police forces and prosecutors’ offices, and a weak 
judiciary. But the drug trade does feed upon, magnify, and 
exacerbate these problems.14 
In 1999, in an effort to counter the existing corruption among the police, 
the Mexican government created the Federal Preventive Police.  This police 
force integrated members of the Army, Navy, Federal Highway Police, Fiscal 
Police, and the Interior Ministry's Center for Research and National Security.  
Initially, controversy surfaced about the legality of this decision because it 
seemed to contravene Article 129 of the Mexican Constitution.  This specifies: 
                                            
13 Hector Tobar and Carlos Martinez, “Mexico Meth Raid Yields $205 million in U.S. Cash,” 
Los Angeles Times, 17 March 2007, Home Edition, [journal online]; available from 
http://proquest.umi.com/ 
pqdweb?did=1235302401&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; 
accessed 5 May 2007. 
14 Laurie Freeman, “State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico,” 
Washington Office on Latin America, June 1996 [web site]; available from 
http://www.wola.org/media/publications/english/mexico/mexico_state_of_siege_06.06.pdf; 
Internet; accessed 23 May 2007, 2. 
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In time of peace, no military authority may exercise more functions 
than those that have an exact connection with military discipline. 
There will only be fixed and permanent military commands in the 
forts, bases, and depots on which the Government of the Union 
depends, or in camps, quarters, or barracks established outside 
populated areas for the stationing of troops.15 
Despite questioning the constitutional validity of assigning military units to 
work with the Federal Preventive Police, the Supreme Court ruled: “while the 
authorities require the support of the Army, and considering that the armed 
forces are at the order of the president, its participation in assignments dealing 
with public security are not in violation of constitutional provisions.”16 
The outcome of this policy, however, has had dichotomous implications.  
The Mexican government has been accused of militarizing public security forces 
and criticized for the increased roles the military has assumed.  Because of the 
populations’ negative experiences with military and police, these fears 
perpetuate.  Nevertheless, the Mexican government has attempted to change its 
public security institutions and the negative perception of the population. The 
Federal Preventive Police is viewed as being more credible by infusing it with 
members of the military.  Further, it does not hire from other police corporations 
that have been exposed to corruption.  In 2001, the Mexican government took 
more measures to clean and strengthen the criminal justice system by creating 
the Federal Investigations Agency.  This agency was created to replace the 
Federal Judicial Police who had a reputation for poor professionalism, illegal 
procedures, and corruption.  The creation of this new police force is seen as a 
move toward creating a multi-skilled, investigative police force.  It also avoids 
                                            
15 H. Congreso de la Unión, “Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
[Political Constitution of the United Mexican States],” Article 129, fraction VI [Web site]; available 
from http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/1.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 October 2007. 
16 Jordi Diez and Ian Nicholls, The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition [book online.] 
(Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006); available from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB638.pdf; Internet; cited 21 March 2007, 
39. 
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possible contamination from other corrupt government organizations.17  In 
December 2005, the Mexican government’s success in developing a 
professionally reliable police force was tarnished: the Office of the Attorney 
General published a report confirming that “1,493 AFI agents (out of 
approximately 7,000) were under investigation for possible criminal activity and 
457 were facing prosecution.”18  This type of information reinforces the negative 
public perception of government institutions.  It is in the best interest of criminal 
organizations to undermine credibility and to foster a negative image of law 
enforcement and judicial institutions.19  There is only one way to definitively 
change the image of the military and the police force involved in counter drug 
trafficking operations: change the way the police and the military operate vis-à-
vis the general population.  Therefore, the Mexican Armed Forces must be 
cognizant of human rights’ issues to gain popular support.  This theme is 
reinforced in Mexico's military: “virtually every [military] course, whether for 
privates or generals, includes a human rights component.”20  Clearly, the 
Mexican Armed Forces is aware of the public perception of Information 
Operations and human rights' violations. 
E. MILITARY REGULATIONS RELEVANT TO INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS 
The existence of Mexico's Armed Forces is rooted in Mexico's 
Constitution.  Article 73 explicitly gives the Mexican Congress the power to raise 
and sustain the armed institutions of the Union -- Army, Navy, and Air force.21  
This article also enables Congress to regulate the organization and service of the 
                                            
17 Graham H. Turbiville Jr. “Mexico Replaces Federal Judicial Police.” Special Warfare 14 
(2001): 56. 
18 Freeman, 15. 
19 Freeman, 16. 
20 Diez and Nicholls, 26. 
21 H. Congreso de la Unión, “Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
[Political Constitution of the United Mexican States],” Article 73, fraction XIV [Web site]; available 
from http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/1.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 October 2007. 
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country's military institutions.  Additionally, Article 89 authorizes the President of 
the Republic to use all the country’s Armed Forces to guarantee internal safety 
and exterior defense of the Federation.22  Therefore, Mexico's Executive and 
Congressional powers have the inherent right to use the Armed Forces 
domestically.  Still, public discourse often criticizes the government for abusing 
this power.  Finally, in March 1996, the Supreme Court ended the controversy 
about the legality of the military's participation in internal matters: it ruled that "the 
law and the constitution were not violated when the Army was used for public 
safety purposes."23 
F. MEXICO'S POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Perhaps the main reason why the Mexican military establishment does not 
have an Information Operations capability is the nature of Mexico's political 
system.  The system derived out of the Mexican Revolution:  after the end of the 
Porfirio Diaz era in 1911, it was common for groups to fight for control of the 
government.  Not until 1929 did the different forces of the revolution consolidate 
under one political institution -- the founding of the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (PNR) by Plutarco Elías Calles.  The PNR evolved into the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).  It became Mexico's "official" party 
which operated as a "true hegemonic party in the sense that, having itself 
achieved a de facto monopoly over the country's political life, opposition parties 
were always legally recognized."24  The recognition of other political institutions 
as part of a multi-party political model is important in establishing a democratic 
state.  In reality, the concentration of power in the "official" party allowed it to 
establish institutions and to develop procedures that permeated almost every 
                                            
22 H. Congreso de la Unión, “Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
[Political Constitution of the United Mexican States]," Article 89, fraction VI; available from 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/1.pdf; Internet; accessed 11 October 2007. 
23 Angel Gustavo Lopez-Montiel. "The Military, Political Power, and Police Relations in 
Mexico City," Latin American Perspectives 27 (2000): 83. 
24 Kevin J. Middlebrook, ed., Dilemmas of political change in Mexico. (London: Institute of 
Latin American Studies, 2004), 57. 
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aspect of Mexican society.  This omnipresent dynamic of the "official" political 
party allowed it to rule the country for seventy-one years.25  According to Dr. 
George Philip, Professor of Comparative and Latin American Politics at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, this system also allowed "the 
political authorities to combine arbitrariness with the principle of representation 
and to manoeuvre [sic] with flexibility without compromising the reality of 
concentrated power."26  The dynamic of a hegemonic political party allowed the 
government to achieve control "through subtle political strategies emphasizing 
co-optation and mollification."27  According to Martin Needler, the system ran in 
part: 
On the basis of rewards and punishments…..[and] through the 
manipulation of the symbols of legitimacy by means of 
indoctrination and propaganda directed at the population as a 
whole; and through securing the loyalty of the natural constituency 
of the ruling class…by means of co-optation, through recruitment, 
into the ruling group itself.28  
The government’s new structure and the president’s ability to select the 
members of his cabinet created the basis for a tight-working group.  Most of the 
time, it relied on personal relationships.  This gave rise to the propensity of 
corruption. 
In the 1980s, the country and the Mexican party system began 
experiencing significant changes when opposition parties emerged.  According to 
Mónica Serrano, the significance of this transformation is "while in the past the 
main function of opposition [political] parties was to legitimise [sic] the regime and 
contain conflict, they gradually emerged as key channels for 'expressing public 
                                            
25 In 2000, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) at the end of President Ernesto 
Zedillo's administration handed power to Vicente Fox from the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). 
26 George Philip, ed., Politics in Mexico. (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1985), 54. 
27 Dale Story, The Mexican Ruling Party. (New York: Praeger, 1986), 6. 
28 Martin C. Needler, Mexican Politics: The Containment of Conflict. (New York: Praeger, 
1990), 75. 
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discontent with economic policy and political performance'".29  The relevance of 
these democratic channels became evident in 2001, when Vicente Fox Quesada 
of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) won the presidential election breaking the 
seventy-one year and eleven-term political barrier. 
The most significant legacy of the Mexican Revolution is Mexico's 1917 
Constitution.  Today it remains the country's Magna Carta.  Not until the late 
1920s did the government implement many of the revolutionary ideals outlined in 
the Constitution.  As the government redistributed land to peasants and farmers, 
nationalized the oil industry, established the Social Security Institute, favored 
labor unions, and protected national industries, it gradually began to restrict the 
action of the military.  Even though the military remained the armed pillar of the 
government, Mexico was not besieged with threats or reasons to invest 
significant resources that into supporting its social projects.  Since Mexico 
declared war against the Axis Powers during the Second World War, it saw the 
need to strengthen its military power.30  After this conflict, the position of Mexico's 
government towards its military was dominated by adherence to the Estrada 
Doctrine. Its principles were based on non-intervention and self-determination of 
the people.  This "golden rule" doctrine ensured national stability by non- 
interference with other countries' internal issues and by the hope that other 
countries would reciprocate.  Until 1994, this seemed to work.  Then the 
administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari signed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the Unites States and Canada.  NAFTA 
symbolized the opportunity for Mexico to leave the Third World and enter the 
First World of international economic stability.  President Vicente Fox furthered 
the globalization process by saying that "the integration process should not be 
                                            
29 Mónica Serrano, ed., Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections. (London: Institute 
of Latin American Studies, 1998), 7. 
30 On May 22, 1942, President Manuel Ávila Camacho declared war against the Axis of 
Power after German submarines attacked the Mexican ships Potrero del Llano and Faja de Oro 
in the Gulf of Mexico. 
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restricted to the economy; it should also include politics and, most importantly, 
international security, an area where states can show commitment."31 
The Mexican political system was founded by radical military leaders who 
fought in the Mexican Revolution and created the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (PNR).  This allowed the Mexican military to play a prominent role 
in the incipient political life of the country.32  Until the 1940s, it also continued the 
pattern of civil-military-political relationships established during the government of 
Porfirio Díaz.33  In Mexico, the hegemonic nature of the political regime gave 
place to atypical linkage between the country's main political actor and the 
military.  As Roderic Camp describes it: 
Given the monopoly of a one-party system, the Mexican military's 
only ally was the Mexican state or the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) that had dominated the state since 1929.  The military 
was never drawn into political conflicts with other parties, for either 
personal or ideological reasons…34 
After the end of the revolution, the government stabilized the country and 
ended internal conflicts by using its essential tool -- the military.  Furthermore, to 
govern, the government needed the support of the military.  In the organization of 
the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM) during the administration of Lázaro 
Cárdenas del Río when the PNR was transformed into a "corporatist structure 
organized around four functional sectors -- the afore-mentioned labor, peasants, 
popular sectors, and the military," the relevance of the military became evident.35  
According to Camp, Cárdenas' intention was to "balance the military against the 
agrarian and labor sectors within the party and thus lessen its overall political 
                                            
31 Ernesto Encinas Valenzuela, “'Hacer o no hacer' [To do or not to do] Mexican Foreign 
Policy and UN Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006), 4. 
32 Except for the provisional presidency of Emilio Portes Gil from 1928 to 1930, after the 
assassination of president elect Álvaro Obregón, it was not until 1946 that Mexico elected a 
president, Miguel Aleman, with no military background. 
33 Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 37. 
34 Middlebrook, Dilemmas of political change in Mexico, 367. 
35 Story, 25. 
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influence."36  To prevent the military from gaining relevance in national politics, 
he also purged the Army of its most politicized elements and created two 
separate ministries in 1939.  This split the National Defense: it combined the 
Army and Air force and, on the other hand, the Navy.37  However, the successor 
of Cárdenas, Manuel Ávila Camacho, went even further to separate the military 
from policy: he rescinded the inclusion of the military as a sector of the PRM.  He 
made this decision despite being the last Army general elected president of 
Mexico.38  According to Dr. Dale Story, Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Texas, Ávila Camacho "was aware of the controversy surrounding 
the military's role in the party, wanted to emphasize the apolitical status of the 
armed forces, and believed that the political activities of individual soldiers would 
harm military cohesion."39 
It is essential to highlight that gradually "the role of the armed forces in 
politics had visibly diminished … presidents, state governors, and cabinet 
members frequently used to be military officers."40  Needler identifies the reasons 
for this dynamic as diminishing the prospects of a successful military revolt, to 
professionalize the military, and to facilitate economic development.  However, 
because the military assumed the mission of drug interception and eradication, 
the participation of the military in civil-police matters increased during the 
administrations of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado and Carlos Salinas de Gortari.  
However, during the administration of Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, the 
involvement of the military in civil-police matters increased most significantly. 
As a result, when the Armed Forces were assigned to civil authorities, 
public discourse about the Forces’ mission and degree of domestic participation 
spiked.  The participation of the military in civil-police matters had the adverse 
                                            
36 Camp, 128. 
37 Story, 99. 
38 Needler, 27-28. 
39 Story, 28. 
40 Needler, 5. 
 15
consequence of exposing the military to criticism.  This damaged the military’s 
image.41  In In response to this unforeseen consequence, Mexican Armed 
Forces emphasized human rights’ training and established rules of engagement.  
Despite isolated cases of corruption and excessive use of force, most Mexicans 
consider the Mexican Armed Forces as an honorable and trustworthy institution.  
As Jordi Diez describes it: 
In Mexico the military is one of the most respected of national 
institutions among the population, and one on which many 
Mexicans depend, especially in rural [and costal] areas, for help 
such as the delivery of medical services and natural disaster 
relief.42 
1. As it Relates to the Mexican Navy 
The Mexican Navy as well as the rest of the Mexican military 
establishment has focused on what Jordi Diez call an "inward orientation," 
focusing almost entirely on internal matters such as drug trafficking and crime.43  
The evolution of the Mexican Armed Forces was assisted by the fact that 
interstate warfare is hardly a realistic probability in the region.44  Nevertheless, 
after the terrorist attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001 against the United 
States, it became evident that terrorist organizations could attack anywhere to 
disrupt the economy and politics of the United States.45  Mexico was among the 
many countries affected by these terrorist actions.  It realized its delicate position 
as a commercial partner and oil provider to the United States and, hence, its 
potential as a target for terrorist actions.  In July 2007, according to data from the 
Energy Information Administration, Mexico was the second-largest supplier of 
                                            
41 For more information about this, see: Angel Gustavo Lopez-Montiel. "The Military, Political 
Power, and Police Relations in Mexico City," Latin American Perspectives 27, (2000). 
42 Diez and Nicholls, 3. 
43 Diez and Nicholls, 20. 
44 Needler, 79. 
45 Subsequent terrorist attacks were conducted in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004; and in 
London, United Kingdom, on July 7, 2005. 
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crude oil to the United States, behind Canada.46  Three-quarters of Mexico's oil 
now comes from offshore sites in Campeche Sound in the Gulf of Mexico – the 
responsibility of the Mexican Navy.47 
In response to these terrorist activities, the Mexican Navy increased its 
operational tempo to protect strategic installations.  Additionally, the operating 
expenses of the Mexican Navy increased significantly: it has acquired new 
equipment and technology for its operations.  The Mexican Government spends 
significant money to meet international anti-terrorist security standards and 
measures -- especially those established by the United Nations’ (UN) 
International Conventions, the International Maritime Organization (OMI), and the 
United States of America.  An unintended benefit of the increase in security and 
surveillance was that the Navy made more drug seizures.  Additionally, the 
augmented surveillance by the Mexican Navy has reduced illegal immigration 
into Mexico.48 
 
                                            
46 Energy Information Administration, "U.S. imports by country of origins," 28 September 
2007 [web site], available from 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m.htm; Internet; 
accessed 10 October 2007. 
47 José N. Iturriaga, “Oil rigs in Campeche Sound,” México desconocido, Autumn 1998. 
[journal online]; available from 
http://www.mexicodesconocido.com.mx/english/cultura_y_sociedad/actividades_economicas/det
alle.cfm?idsec=17&idsub=85&idpag=1305; Internet; accessed 27 July 2006. 
48 During 2006, the Mexican Navy worked with the National Migration Institute detaining 263 
illegal aliens.  For more information see: Secretaría de Marina-Armada de México, Consejo del 
Almirantazgo, “Informe de labores 2006," [web site]; available from 
http://www.semar.gob.mx/transparencia/informe_labores_2006.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 August 
2007, 33. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Deception and Psychological Operations have always been used to 
deceive an enemy and to influence him to take certain actions that favor the 
deceiver.  When supported by additional measures to keep the enemy from 
gaining information about the forces or intentions of its rival, The chances of 
success for these operations are significantly increased.  Despite its common 
use against enemies from other states, the principles and components of 
Information Operations can be used within a state to optimize limited capabilities.  
In 1930, Mexico adopted the Estrada Doctrine to guide its foreign policy based 
on principles of non-intervention and self-determination of the people.49  
According to Martin C. Needler: 
The Estrada Doctrine stipulates that countries should extend 
diplomatic recognition to all de facto governments of other 
countries, without concerning themselves about whether such 
governments have the [lawful] status.50 
The adherence to these principles has prevented Mexico from becoming 
involved in disputes with other countries.  The geo-strategic location of Mexico 
automatically places it under the de facto umbrella of U.S. protection "causing the 
Mexican military to focus on internal defense."51  The Mexican Navy identifies the 
need to defend national sovereignty, protect strategic installations, control 
maritime traffic, protect national resources, maintain the state of law, protect life 
at sea, and sponsor national maritime development.  The most significant 
challenges for the Mexican military are those related to counter drug trafficking 
and revolutionary insurgencies capable of conducting acts of terrorism.  Both 
 
 
                                            
49 Named after the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 1930, Genaro Estrada. 
50 Needler, 117. 
51 Diez and Nicholls, 21. 
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challenges present opportunities for the implementation of Information 
Operations strategies to optimize the use of untraditional resources to support 
military objectives. 
This chapter presents the organization of this investigation, describes the 
theories used to study insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, as well as the 
theories used to understand the response of the Mexican Navy.  This chapter 
also highlights the relevance of Information Operations as an instrument of 
policy. 
A. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
Since the end of the Second World War, there have been many studies of 
how adversaries have used different types of deception, denial, and counter 
deception against each other.  The concept of Information Operations, as it 
exists, is the result of practical lessons learned in combat and subsequent 
studies and theories.  This study uses historical data and contemporary 
information to investigate Information Operations, focusing on its psychological 
operations component and its use to support government actions, as well as 
military and political objectives. 
This thesis focuses on Mexico’s military ability to deal with future irregular 
threats.  Since it is a Latin American country with similar military capabilities, we 
have selected Colombia as a case study.  Colombia also shares many of the 
same national security concerns as Mexico and uses its military to counter such 
threats.  For instance, the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas is an assertion of pre-
Colombian ideas and practices filtered through a complex history of uneven 
capitalist development.  Furthermore, the drug cartels and insurgent movements 
have also paralleled each other.  However, this thesis does not necessarily 
advocate the Colombian counterinsurgency model and agrees that Colombia and 
Mexico are not entirely parallel comparisons. 
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Chapter I introduces the overall study and describes the Mexican Armed 
Forces, and particularly the role of the Mexican Navy.  This chapter also presents 
a concise history of the Mexican political system, as well as the opportunities and 
challenges for the Mexican Armed Forces. 
Chapter II presents the insurgency and counterinsurgency model 
developed by Dr. Gordon H. McCormick as the theoretical framework to 
understand the interaction of the state, the counter-state or insurgency, the 
population, and the external actors. It also uses Irving Janis’ conceptual models 
of groupthink to identify the reasons why the creation of an Information 
Operations capability has not been considered.  Finally, it shows the importance 
of Information Operations as an instrument of policy. 
Chapter III presents an in depth case study of Colombia in relation to the 
development of Information Operation capabilities.  It also illustrates how it is 
used to support its policies and attain its desired objectives.  Further, this chapter 
presents a concise case study of Mexico and describes how the country has 
managed its challenges without an established Information Operations capability. 
Chapter IV makes recommendations derived from the McCormick Model 
of Counterinsurgency for implementation in Mexico.  This chapter also offers 
Information Operations propositions relevant to Mexico’s Armed Forces and 
outlines the reasons of why Mexico’s Navy should take the lead in implementing 
these types of operations.  Finally, this chapter highlights the main points of this 
thesis and summarizes the recommendations that will assist Mexico in dealing 
with the nation’s rising unconventional threats. 
1. McCormick's Model of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
This thesis uses the insurgency and counterinsurgency model developed 
by Gordon H. McCormick52 to frame the unconventional strategy and the use of 
                                            
52 Dr. McCormick, Chair, Naval Postgraduate School Defense Analysis Department, 
developed the Model of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in 1994. 
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Information Operations by the state.  This model offers a better understanding of 
how an insurgency works, as well as the interaction and relations among the 
different actors involved. 
McCormick's Model of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, also known as 
the Mystic Diamond, is an analytical tool that models the struggle of the state 
versus the counter state.  This model considers four different actors: the state, 
the counter state or insurgency, the population (endogeny), and international 
actors (exogeny).  The first actor, the state, is understood as the current 
government or occupying force in a certain country or region that is forced to deal 
with the insurgency.  The second actor, the counter state or insurgency, 
essentially consists of those members of an insurgent guerrilla movement or 
group that challenges the status quo of the state.  It also consists of those 
individuals, groups or organizations that passively or actively support the 
insurgent force and obstruct the action of the state.  The main objective of the 
counter state is to overthrow the current government or occupying forces by any 
means available to establish a new government.  The third actor, the population, 
consists of all non-combatant and neutral individuals within a disputed territory 
that have the capability to support either the state or counter state.  The last 
actor, the international actors, are those external nation states, international 
organizations, or Non-Governmental (NGO's) actors, capable of taking sides or 
already involved in the struggle between the state and the counter state.  In this 
era of global communications and transnational economic interests, the state and 
the insurgency usually receive support from international actors who are 
protecting their particular interests. 
The versatility of McCormick's model allows it to be subdivided into two 
variants.  The first variant is when the insurgency happens within a state and 
does not have any support from an external actor.  In this case, the state deals 
with the pure insurgency since there are no external sources of influence 
involved in the struggle.  The second variant of the Mystic Diamond appears 
when the insurgency receives support from an external actor in its struggle 
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against the state.  In this case, insurgents become partisans supported by an 
external actor.  This thesis uses the Model of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
in its most complete form, using both variants to analyze the interaction of 
populations and external actors as they relate to the insurgency and the state. 
 
 
Figure 1.   McCormick's model of insurgency. 
From: Gordon H. McCormick, Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare Lecture Notes, 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Summer Quarter 2006). 
 
The model developed by McCormick visualizes the insurgency problem as 
integrated by two dynamic interdependent systems -- one represented by the 
state and the other by the insurgents or counter state -- that interact in a zero-
sum game to control the population and the political space.  According to this 
model, both actors compete to gain the support and control of the population 
while depriving the adversary of the same benefit.  The competition between the 
state and the insurgency is a dynamic process that takes place within existing 
geo-political, economic, social, and cultural conditions.  Nevertheless, the 
conditions that govern this asymmetric fight between the state and the guerrillas 
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are: the government begins the struggle with a significant force advantage over 
the guerrillas; the guerrillas have an indubitable information advantage over most 
governments.  The advantage of the latter rests on its capability of constantly 
gathering information about the government and using it as propaganda.  
Essentially, while the guerrilla can easily see the government, it is almost 
impossible for the government to see the guerrilla.  The guerrilla can easily level 
the force disadvantage by exploiting its information warfare capabilities.  
Therefore, the challenge to the government is to transcend its force advantage 
into an information advantage.  Nevertheless, the guerrilla is in a better position 
to control the assisted preferences of the population because they are embedded 
among them and know them better than the government.  Rather than the 
impersonal level of communications that most governments aspire to have, 
specifically Mexico, embedding allows the guerrillas to establish better 
communication with the people. 
a. Operational Strategies for Both Players 
According to McCormick's insurgency model, the interaction of 
different actors is such that "individual actions [taken by any one of them] can 
have multiple effects"53 on each other.  This will be described in depth later in 
this chapter.  As a result, several strategies can be derived from the Diamond 
Model structure.  The arrows and numbers on McCormick's model of insurgency 
(figure 1) represent the different operational strategies. 
According to McCormick's Model, the state and the insurgent have 
the same five strategies available.  This will be explained in detail later in this 
chapter.  Usually the fight begins with the strategy of gaining support of the 
population (strategy 1), gradually evolving to the strategy of disrupting the control 
of the opponent over the population (strategy 2), and, ultimately, taking direct 
action against the adversary (strategy 3).  Nevertheless, these three strategies 
                                            
53 Gordon McCormick, Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare class notes (Naval Postgraduate 
School, Summer 2006). 
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are usually complemented by simultaneously working on gaining the favor of the 
international community (strategy 4), and, once achieved, disrupting the support 
of the international community for the opponent (strategy 5). 
(1)  Gain the Support of the Population.  The support of the 
population is a fundamental feature in the struggle against an adversary.  In the 
case of the state, it is the support of the population that enables the state to gain 
insight and information about the insurgency and its activities.  When a 
population does not assist the government with information about the insurgency, 
it inadvertently supports the insurgency.  The lack of sufficient and appropriate 
information about the insurgency directly affects the capability of the state to 
respond to the insurgent threat.  However, when a population cooperates with 
the government by providing information about the insurgency, the government is 
better equipped to deal with the insurgency.  Therefore, it is in the government’s 
best interest to obtain the population’s support to effectively counter an 
insurgency.  According to Dr. McCormick, "no matter how weak the state is, with 
appropriate information it can destroy the insurgency."54  Meanwhile, for the 
insurgency, the population also represents a valuable asset since it can provide 
information about the activities of the state, and supply the insurgency with 
weapons and economic resources to support the cause.  Most significantly, the 
population provides the insurgency with an active environment that gives 
insurgents the opportunity to blend with the population and to hide from the 
actions of the state.  The relationship of the counter state and the population is 
so personal that any part of the population not controlled by the government is 
likely to be controlled by insurgents.  The insurgency expects to gain force 
multipliers, while the state looks to gain popular support.  Vital is the fact that the 
behavior of both actors towards the population is subject to constant change 
based on the feedback obtained from the interaction with the population.   
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Ultimately for both actors, obtaining the support of the population is the most 
significant and decisive factor to win.  Finally, the use of mass media is a 
significant tool in achieving this step. 
(2)  Disrupt the Control of the Opponent over the Population.  
Since the population's support is significant in overcoming an adversary, afflicting 
the relationship of the opponent with the populace constitutes an essential 
objective in the struggle between the state and the counter state.  To achieve 
this, both adversaries constantly try to damage the opponent's relationship with 
the population and, thus, to delegitimize its authority.  Therefore, it is essential for 
both sides to maintain legitimacy to be able to control and gain the sympathy of 
the population. 
(3)  Direct Action.  Eventually, as the two adversaries gain 
strength, gather support from the population and information about each other, 
they are able to launch direct attacks against one another.  These actions aim to 
disrupt the enemy's operations, destroy, or capture forces, and weaken the 
resolution to continue fighting.  Nevertheless, the support of the population 
remains essential for success. 
(4)  Compete for the Favor of the International Community.  
In this dynamic struggle between the state and the insurgency, it is essential for 
both adversaries to have the support of an external actor.  As a consequence, 
both actors are constantly trying to legitimize their positions to gain and maintain 
the support from external actors.  The strategy of competing for the favor of the 
international community is also subject to constant change based on the 
feedback obtained from the interaction with the external actors. 
(5)  Disrupt the Support from the International Community to 
the Opponent.  When an external actor is involved in the struggle between the 
state and the insurgency, it is essential for both opponents to delegitimize their 
respective enemy in the eyes of the international community to deprive it from its 
support.  In this zero-sum game, the support of an external actor is a very 
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significant factor for the state and the insurgency: it directly affects the outcome.  
The strategy of disrupting support from the international community constantly 
changes and is dependent on the feedback obtained from the interaction with 
external actors. 
B. ALLISON AND ZELIKOW'S CONCEPTUAL MODELS AND 
GROUPTHINK FRAMEWORK 
The concept of “Information Operations” has evolved within the military as 
a result of the need to optimize the use of human and material resources to 
indirectly influence the enemy.  This type of operation is mostly used by the 
military establishments of those countries that have developed the technological 
resources and expertise to integrate efforts to influence an adversary.  
Previously, these were carried out almost in an independent manner, but now 
operations encompass a diversity of operations that have been integrated with 
new developments in information technology.  Despite the proven success of 
Information Operations, many countries have not tried to develop such 
capabilities.  In some cases, the reason for not developing this capability is 
budgetary; in others it rests on a lack of understating of its advantages.  In the 
case of the Mexican Navy, the development of an Information Operations 
capability has been constrained by both factors.  Currently, the Mexican Navy 
does not have a specialized unit capable of conducting Information Operations.  
If the Mexican Navy were to develop such a capability, it could further strengthen 
its cooperation with other government agencies. 
To understand the reasons why the Mexican Navy has not developed an 
Information Operations capability, we use the concepts presented by Graham 
Allison and Phillip Zelikow in their book Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.  The authors present three different conceptual models to 
try to understand how, at the different levels of government, decisions are made 
and who is involved.  These conceptual models are: Rational Actor Model, 
Organizational Behavior Model, and Governmental Politics Model.  The rigor of 
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these models derives from the assumption that actions are taken as a result of 
rational choices among different possibilities and outcomes.  The rational choice 
model implies there is a rational thought and decision process that cherishes 
“consistency among goals and objectives relative to a particular action; 
consistency in the application of principles in order to select the optimal 
alternative.”55  These different models of rational action consider four core 
concepts in the decision making process: goals and objectives, alternatives, 
consequences, and choice.  Each of them represents a different aspect in the 
decision making process.  In this context, the rationality of the process refers to 
the “consistent, value maximizing choice within specified constraints.”56 
The point of the Rational Actor Model is to offer an explanation and “show 
how the nation or government could have chosen to act as it did, given the 
strategic problems it faced.”57  This model assumes the government is the 
primary actor in the decision making process: it makes its decisions based on its 
goals and the potential payoff of each decision before deciding a specific course 
of action.  In other words, “governments are anthropomorphized as if they were 
individuals.”58  In this model, the government, as a unified cohesive entity, makes 
its decisions based on maximizing its means toward the state’s ends.  To apply 
the Rational Actor Model to the Mexican Navy, we assume that it is the primary 
actor in the decision making process; also that the Mexican Navy identified, 
examined, and assessed the different courses of action available to maximize its 
ability to achieve the states' strategic goals and objectives.  The goals and 
objectives of the Mexican Navy are derived from its mission as specified in the 
Mexican Constitution -- to use the naval power of the Federation for external 
                                            
55 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, 5th ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), 17. 
56 Allison and Zelikow, 18. 
57 Allison and Zelikow, 4. 
58 Allison and Zelikow, 144. 
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defense and to help in the internal security of the country.59  Throughout its 
history, most of the Mexican Navy’s goals and objectives have been related to 
the preservation of juridical order at sea, protection of fisheries, protection of 
strategic installations, and protection of human life at sea. 
Some of the most significant threats that the Mexican Navy encounters 
today are related to drug trafficking.  Nevertheless, there are other threats that 
arise when the institution operates in support of other civilian agencies.  An 
example of such threats can be seen in the uprising of the Zapatista movement.  
Prior to the appearance of the Zapatista insurgency in the southern state of 
Chiapas, neither military nor civilian government agencies possessed the 
capability to counter the innovative information campaign of the Zapatista 
movement.  According to Roderic Ai Camp: 
Although the military had provided accurate intelligence on the 
Zapatistas' activities long before their surprise attack, civilian 
intelligence authorities in the Secretariat of Government either 
chose to ignore that information or convinced themselves that they 
could delay resolving festering conflicts in the region, despite 
evidence to the contrary.60 
The lack of this capability allowed the Zapatistas to exploit the criticism 
that already existed towards the Mexican government.  This contributed to 
making the government appear authoritarian, uninterested in the well-being of 
indigenous people, and disrespectful of human rights. 
Thus far, the Mexican Navy has not given proper attention to the 
development of an Information Operations capability.  This is a consequence of 
the perception that the Navy is not designed to conduct operations to influence 
the perception of the Mexican population.  Another factor that has prevented the 
Mexican Navy from appreciating the need for developing an Information 
                                            
59 Secretaría de Marina. "Ley Orgánica de la Armada de México [Organic Law of the 
Mexican Navy]," Article 1 [web site]; available from 
http://www.semar.gob.mx/juridico/org_armada.htm; Internet; accessed 15 August 2007. 
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Operations capability is that Navy currently does its job well.  Thus, there is no 
need to change or to seek additional capabilities.  Additionally, the Navy does not 
want to attract the attention of politicians, opposing political parties, or to 
encourage unpopular support.  The Mexican Navy chooses to remain in the sea 
environment and avoids becoming involved in potential conflicts over interests 
with other government agencies -- especially the Mexican Army. 
The Organizational Behavior Model considers governmental actions as 
outputs of large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of 
behavior.  This is partially coordinated by government leaders.61  This model 
explains the conduct of organizations using its purposes, practices, and 
characteristics of its members.62  This model is directly related to the role of 
organizations in modern global society.  There are many organizations that 
expand their influence beyond the borders of the state, making their 
headquarters there.  They have more economic power than many developing 
countries.  Modern society is based on the existence of increasingly more 
complex organizations that sometimes interact to obtain organizational output. 
Applying the Organizational Behavior Model to the case of the Mexican 
Navy identifies that this organization is not an individual, but, rather, a large 
collection of people, departments, and divisions whose actions are limited by 
their standard patterns of behavior.  In this conceptual model, the differences in 
the outcome of the organization are influenced by the priorities and perceptions 
of the different components.  Within this context, each administrative and 
operational part of the Mexican Navy has, to some degree, been reluctant to 
assume the new responsibility of designing an Information Operations capability.  
The various entities within the Mexican Navy believe that their current public 
relationships suffice the needs of the public and their leadership.  Meanwhile, the 
operational units think that most of what they do is specialized.  They also think 
that their interactions with the population are enough to shape the public’s 
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perception of the institution.  Consequently, the priorities of the Mexican Navy are 
shaped to focus on the satisfaction of its operational aspects -- rather than on 
influencing the perception of the population. 
The public relations’ units of the Mexican Navy react to the social and 
political dynamics prevalent in the country.  As a result, a significant part of the 
activities of the public relations unit is directed to informing the people about the 
activities of the Mexican Navy.  The impact of this on the population is 
questionable, particularly when compared to the influence of opposing political 
parties, reports from the media, and the mistrust of the population caused by the 
negative perception of governmental actions.  From the organization’s 
perspective, another aspect that seems to influence the lack of interest in 
developing additional capabilities is that the organization seems to be “working 
right.”  Thus, there is no need to seek additional tasks that will eventually 
represent additional responsibilities.  Furthermore, when the need arises, the 
institution seeks a solution within the existing options available, settling on one 
that adequately addresses the tasks at hand.  By not trying to overextend its 
assets and resources to achieve too many goals, the Mexican Navy has adopted 
a conservative and prudent strategy in dealing with the different issues that it 
faces.  This strategy is the result of the established Standard Operating 
Procedures and conformity within the existing organization. 
The Governmental Politics Model considers government action as the 
result of the interaction between players in key positions within the government.  
In this model, the outcome can be understood as the bargaining “among the 
players positioned hierarchically within the government.”63  Within this dynamic, 
sometimes the course of action favored by one group is imposed on the rest.  At 
other times; the course of action chosen is the result of the interaction among the 
different actors involved in the decision making process. 
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De-escalating the Governmental Politics Model to apply it to an 
organization, we are able to identify the different groups that interact in what 
appears, to them, to be the best possible outcome.  As in any organization, within 
the Mexican Navy there is a certain degree of competition -- among the different 
units, areas, divisions, and departments -- to increase their influence among their 
respective leaders and, ultimately, increase the power of the individual 
organization.  Nevertheless, the military hierarchy that exists throughout the 
Mexican Navy, and most military institutions, limits the amount and kind of 
influence that a subordinate can have on the upper echelons of the organization.  
This is particularly relevant because most of the time the same actors are the 
ones that have access to the Secretary of the Navy.  They are more likely to 
have a larger influence on a final decision.  Essentially, these different actors 
focused on attaining the goals of their particular areas.  They did not want to 
propose the establishment of something that lacked support from other relevant 
actors within the organization -- or that presented a potential for future criticism. 
Another useful work that complements the understanding of the decision 
making process, at government level or within organizations, is the work of Irving 
Janis: the theory of groupthink.  This theory describes how the members of a 
group try to reach consensus by minimizing conflict.  In the process, they fail to 
critically test, analyze, and evaluate the different actions available and the 
possible consequences of each of them.  Eventually, they end up with a less than 
optimal solution.  A characteristic of this type of dynamic is that, for the sake of 
attaining consensus, the members of the group fail to present viewpoints that 
might be unwelcomed by the rest of the group.  Thus, the members of the group 
auto-censure their opinions to assure acceptance by the rest of the group.  In this 
context, Janis presents eight symptoms to identify groupthink, which are: 
¾ An illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or all members, which 
creates excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks; 
¾ Collective efforts to discount warnings which might lead the 
members to reconsider their assumptions before they recommit 
themselves to their past policy decisions; 
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¾ An unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality, inclining the 
members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their 
decisions; 
¾ Stereotyped views of enemy leaders as too evil to warrant genuine 
attempts to negotiate, or as too weak to counter whatever risky 
attempts are made to defeat their purposes; 
¾ Direct pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments 
against any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, 
making clear that this type of dissent is contrary to what is expected 
of all loyal members; 
¾ Self-censorship of deviations or the apparent group consensus, 
reflecting each member’s inclination to minimize to himself the 
importance of his doubts and counterarguments; 
¾ A shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming to 
the majority view; 
¾ The emergence of self-appointed mindguards to protect the group 
from adverse information that might affect the complacency of the 
group.64 
1. Framework Analysis 
The principles of non-intervention and self-determination by the people 
expressed in the Estrada Doctrine have shaped and guided Mexican foreign 
policy -- as well as the role of its Armed forces.  In the past, whenever it has been 
necessary to deal with internal problems, the Mexican government usually has 
chosen to befriend its potential adversaries.  According to Dale Story, this 
strategy is a positive-sum game that benefits everyone.  The difficulty of this 
strategy is that "only a certain amount of rewards or benefits can be distributed 
before crossing the unacceptable limits of granting too much power to the 
opposition."65  Political co-option as a form of Information Operation proved 
useful for the Mexican government to influence public opinion to support its 
actions and preserve tranquility.  Nevertheless, the lack of a systematic 
Information Operations campaigns, combined with the inability of the state to 
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satisfy the increasing demands of some sectors of the population, failed to 
assure social stability.  Even though political co-option was useful for the 
government to deal in the short term with some issues, its focus had the adverse 
consequence: preventing the development of other capabilities that would have 
been useful to counter the information campaigns launched by the Zapatistas 
after the 1994 uprising. 
The use of the three conceptual models developed by Allison and Zelikow 
present a useful tool to understand the reasons why the Mexican Navy has not 
developed an Information Operations capability. 
Each one of these conceptual models offers a different perspective from 
which to consider the question.  The Rational Actor Model illustrates that the 
Mexican Navy, as a rational decision maker, taking into consideration its goals 
and objectives, chose not to develop an Information Operations capability to 
continue operating predominantly in the sea environment.  The Navy avoided 
getting involved in potential conflicts over interests with other government 
agencies. 
The Organizational Behavior model shows that because the adherence of 
different units, departments, and divisions to their respective Standard Operating 
Procedures,66 each does not visualize the need to develop an additional 
Information Operations capability.  Each entity tended to solve problems in the 
routine way that had worked on previous occasions.  Ultimately, the decision of 
the Mexican Navy not to develop an Information Operations capability was the 
result of the established Standard Operating Procedures and conformity with the 
existing procedures -- rather than a choice made on purpose -- and the best 
selection among the available courses of action. 
                                            
66 On January 16, 2002, the Mexican Navy established a Quality Control Committee [Comité 
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Finally, the Governmental Politics Model argues that the additional 
Information Operations capability was not developed due to lack of support or 
interest from different relevant actors and groups who may have influenced the 
decision making within the organization. 
Assuming that the Mexican Navy has the resources and training available, 
we assume that the Mexican Navy has not realized the need to develop an 
Information Operations capability.  This perception is reinforced by the fact that 
relevant actors and groups, who influence the decision-making process within the 
organization, have focused predominantly on operating in a sea environment; 
also, they are focused on applying the existent Standard Operating Procedures 
which do not consider the development of an Information Operations capability. 
The interaction of military actors within the hierarchical structure of the 
Mexican Navy has the propensity of using their institutional thinking.  This often 
results in a groupthink product.  This dynamic is further encouraged by the 
constant need to deal with budget constraints and personnel limitations. 
C. IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT 
OF POLICY 
The relevance of Information Operations as an instrument of policy 
resides in its potential to support, optimize, and magnify government actions and 
to shape an adversary's behavior to facilitate reaching one's own strategic 
objective.  According to the authoritative publication on U.S. Information 
Operations (Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations), these types of 
operations are considered integral to the successful execution of military 
operations.  This is because the main goal is to "achieve and maintain 
information superiority for the U.S. and its allies."67 
When properly used, Information Operations allows the user of such 
techniques to effectively target the hearts and minds of the objective audience to 
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influence its behavior according to the user's best interests.  Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, 
Assistant Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
highlights the relevance of winning the ideological war in any operation: 
The focus of all civil and military plans and operations must be on 
the center of gravity in any conflict— the country’s people and their 
belief in and support of their government. Winning their hearts and 
minds must be the objective of the government’s efforts.68 
The versatility of Information Operations can be used to strengthen, 
coordinate, and to unify government efforts towards the population to attain 
objectives.  Nevertheless, it seems that the term "Information Operations," 
particularly when referring to the psychological operations component, tends to 
scare most populations about the possibility of being manipulated by the state.  
Just as Ensign Wrona conveys in her thesis: 
Persuading rather than compelling physically, PSYOP relies on 
logic, fear, desire, or other mental factors to promote specific 
emotions, attitudes, or behaviors.  When properly employed, 
PSYOP can reduce an adversary's will to fight.  The intended 
purpose of PSYOP is to influence the targeted audience to take 
certain actions based on the information and indicators provided.69 
Despite the mistrust of some population sectors towards the government, 
seldom does the population think about the possibility that their skepticism and 
hostility towards the state is the product of an Information Operations campaign 
launched by somebody else.  Developing countries are constantly struggling to 
allocate scarce and limited resources to meet the increasing needs of the 
population.  Despite government actions to optimize resources available to 
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satisfy the increasing needs and demands of the population, governments 
frequently fail in earning the support of the population.  This dynamic is further 
advanced by large social differences that coexist in developing countries.  For 
example, high levels of corruption among government authorities and increasing 
levels of social and political violence provide an encouraging environment where 
"sectors of civil society fight among themselves and against the state."70  Within 
this detrimental dynamic, the government must take appropriate actions to 
influence the population to assume a positive, participative, and supporting 
attitude towards its policies.  In this context, Information Operations represents 
useful techniques through which the state can attain these objectives.  It is 
crucial that the state, as an entity, keep in mind the strategic objectives of the 
Information Operations campaign.  This avoids being influenced by short term 
thinking that might represent tactical victories that, eventually, might have 
unintended negative outcomes.  When planning information operation 
campaigns, states must focus on long-term objectives.  This assures that all 
subsequent government efforts mutually support each other to achieve the same 
strategic goals.  Additionally, the planning phase of an Information Operations 
campaign takes into consideration the different means and resources. 
To the state, Information Operations represents a comprehensive toll set 
to support its actions towards its strategic goals.  It also supports the 
development and implementation of government policies.  The state can further 
support the psychological operations’ component of Information Operations by 
using some of the other components of this type of warfare.  Carl von Clausewitz 
writes "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means…The political 
object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be 
considered in isolation from their purpose."71 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter showed the methodology and organization of this research.  
It also described the insurgency and counterinsurgency model developed by 
Gordon H. McCormick -- also known as the Mystic Diamond -- to frame the 
analysis of the use of Information Operations by insurgencies and the response 
of the state.  This chapter also described the operational strategies for both 
players in the Mystic Diamond while taking into consideration the different 
courses of action available to each of the contending actors. 
In addition, this chapter introduced and used the conceptual models 
developed by Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow to gain a better understanding 
of the reasons why the Mexican Navy has not developed an Information 
Operations capability.  The theory of groupthink developed by Irving Janis was 
also drawn upon to gain a better understanding of the decision making process 
at the government level. 
Finally, this chapter depicted the relevance of Information Operations as 
an instrument of policy and focused on the potential to support, optimize, and 
magnify government actions to indirectly shape an adversary's behavior to 
influence a desired outcome. 
Despite the success of Mexican Navy operations, there is opportunity for 
improvement.  It is important to learn how other countries use Information 
Operations as policy supporting instruments.  The next chapter will use 
Colombia's experience countering guerrillas as a case study to draw upon 
information operation practices in Latin America. 
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III. INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Most Latin American countries, as well as other developing countries, face 
a wide variety of challenges in their social, economic, and political stability.  The 
root causes for this dynamic vary from one country to another. Nevertheless, the 
matters that most endanger the security of Latin American countries are those 
related to weak state institutions.  Weak institutions inadequately shape and limit 
the response of the state to address issues such as corruption, drug-trafficking, 
organized crime, and poverty.72 
The communications and economic globalization, which have allowed 
regional and global economic integration, have been used by illicit organizations 
to coordinate their efforts against the state.  In Latin America, Colombia stands 
out for its experience in dealing with internal social challenges.  They have been 
reinforced by the state’s inability, or lack of attention, to satisfy the most basic 
demands of some sectors of the population.73 
In Latin America, some countries have used their militaries to support the 
governmental strategy to deal with their internal issues.  In Colombia, this is 
particularly relevant since the state is required to fight internal enemies.  Drug 
trafficking has become the main source of financing for Latin America’s oldest 
and most powerful guerrilla organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia- People’s Army (FARC-EP).  It is significant that in October 1997, the 
Department of State designated the FARC-EP a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) “because it perpetrated and continues to perpetrate bombings, murder, 
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kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerilla [sic] and conventional 
military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets.”74 
The challenge for the Colombian government has been to deal with the 
internal drug war and to prevent a civil war.  The response of the state has been 
shaped to deprive the insurgency of a key asset -- the population’s support.  The 
Colombian military has played a key role in conducting operations to gain the 
support of the population. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a case study of Colombia, the 
development of its Information Operation capabilities, and their use in support of 
governmental policies to attain desired objectives.  The lessons learned from 
similar experiences in Latin America can be useful for the Mexican military in 
countering drug trafficking and insurgencies.  This chapter also presents a 
concise case study of Mexico and describes how the country has managed its 
challenges without an established Information Operations capability. 
A. CASE STUDY: COLOMBIA 
Colombia is located in the junction between Central and South America, 
accesses the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, and borders five countries.  
Its location favors economic interaction with neighboring countries and the world.  
Drug cartels and insurgencies have also taken advantage of the country’s geo-
strategic location to exploit the state's weaknesses for their own purposes. 
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Figure 2.   Physical-political map of Colombia. 
From: "Mapa físico-político de Colombia [physical-political map of Colombia]," 
Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi [Agustin Codazzi Geographical Institute]; 
available 
http://ssiglims.igac.gov.co/ssigl/mapas_de_colombia/galeria/IGAC/Matis_Colomb
ia.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 August 2007. 
 
The current president, Álvaro Uribe, and his administration, currently fight 
three concurrent wars against narco-trafficking, paramilitaries, and rebel 
insurgent groups.  The fight of the Colombian government against its internal 
enemies has been supported by the United States through the joint United 
States-Colombian strategic Plan Colombia. 
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This chapter will describe how drug trafficking, paramilitary and insurgent 
organizations represent significant challenges to the Colombian government and 
its military.  Drug trafficking has become a primary financial source for 
insurgencies.  Next, we will outline Plan Colombia and describe how it represents 
the main effort of the Colombian government for countering drug trafficking.  
Lastly, we will identify three paramilitary and insurgency organizations. 
1. Drug Trafficking 
Since the 1970s, Colombian drug cartels have produced and smuggled 
marihuana to the United States.  In 1972, President Richard Nixon coined the 
phrase “war on drugs” to oppose the legalization of marihuana.  Eventually, 
during the 1980s, as the drug traffickers looked for alternative ways to increase 
their profits, they began producing and smuggling cocaine, heroine, and synthetic 
drugs.  In 1982, as the American government became aware of the health issues 
related to these drugs and their negative effects on society, President Ronald 
Reagan increased the war on drugs by primarily focusing on “police repression at 
home and interdiction of illegal drugs from producing countries.”75  Nevertheless, 
drug traffickers found alternative methods to continue their lucrative criminal 
activity in the United States and abroad and evaded authorities.  The fact that 
Colombia is the main source of illicit drugs found in the United States has made 
the American government take action.  As a result, “the focus of U.S. policy 
toward Colombia has been to curb narcotics production and trafficking.”76 
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As of 2006, Colombia produced around ninety percent of the cocaine and 
over fifty percent of the heroin marketed in the United States.77  The levels of 
violence associated with drug related activities, combined with the inability of the 
state to enforce public security and satisfy the demands of the population, 
resulted in unprecedented levels of social violence. This came to be known as 
“colombianization" which is "a metaphor for interminable violence and the 
corrupting influence of illegal drugs."78  Colombian drug cartels have almost 
unlimited access to monetary resources.  This allows them to resist the action of 
the state -- either through violence or co-optation. 
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Figure 3.   Coca cultivation density in Colombia, 2006. 
From: "Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey." United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime; available 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/icmp/colombia_2006_en_web.pdf; Internet; 
accessed 8 August 2007, 9. 
 
Drug cartels have invested large amounts of money to co-opt the different 
levels of government and the population.  Because they had been co-opted, 
threatened, or feared the response of the drug related organizations, the level of 
involvement of drug cartels in the political arena was something that few dared to 
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admit.  However, the level of involvement of such organizations and their illicit 
activities were discovered when the United States delegitimized the Colombian 
government's efforts in its fight against drugs.  This effort was led by the Clinton 
administration as a way to put political pressure on the administration of Ernesto 
Samper.  The Clinton administration stated that “Samper had disregarded U.S. 
warnings of cartel contributions to his campaign; found that Colombia was not 
cooperating fully on counter-narcotics efforts; and cited limited cooperation by the 
Colombian government and ‘pervasive corruption’ under the Samper 
administration; and deemed the presidency untrustworthy.”79  Despite wide-
spread corruption in Latin American countries, the Colombian government was 
exposed because "for the first time impunity is being seriously challenged, with 
nine serving members and one former member of Congress in prison and others 
under investigation."80 
The drug cartels have remained popular among some sectors of the 
population.  In some cases, the support of the population has been voluntary; in 
others, the support has derived from coercion or monetary influence.  Voluntary 
support has been essential to the population who do not have alternative means 
of earning a living.  This dynamic is reinforced by the limited capability of the 
state to provide social services, education, and employment to the growing 
population.  Meanwhile, the threats of drug trafficking organizations against the 
population coerce their support. 
Despite its long existence and continuous efforts to gain support from the 
population, "the FARC does not enjoy widespread mass support in the 
Colombian population, even in rural areas.  It has, however, carefully 
proselytized or terrorized in selected locales related to its nation-wide, logistics-
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based strategy."81  Despite the pressure of counterinsurgents, "respected polls 
indicate consistently that less than two percent of society supports FARC and 
ELN."82  Even though only a small fraction of the Colombian population supports 
insurgencies, the insurgents' involvement in drug related activities allow them to 
obtain enough resources to finance their activities.  This relative independence 
and self-sufficient capability to generate economic resources and satisfy 
personnel requirements has minimized the need for widespread support.83 
In the context of Plan Colombia, which will be described in the next 
section, aerial eradication represents a central tactic in the counternarcotics 
strategy of the United States to support the Colombian government in its fight 
against drugs.  Even though aerial eradication has succeeded in destroying the 
coca crop, it has not reduced the status of the country as the largest producer 
and supplier of cocaine in the world.  There are also serious concerns among the 
population and environmental organizations about the side effects of Glyphosate 
glycine and Cosmo-Flux as the herbicides used to spray coca fields.84  The use 
of non-selective, systemic eradication has had the adverse effect of destroying 
the legal crops of thousands of peasants who found themselves with no way to 
make a living.  According to the Putumayo community and some church leaders, 
since spraying damages food crops: 
                                            
81 Geoffrey Demarest, Mapping Colombia: The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy, 
U.S. Army War College, March 2003 [web site]; available from 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dtic/ADA413030.pdf&code=94efdbd97ce1faf71bd6bb4c8197
39d4; Internet; accessed 24 July 2007, 7. 
82 John A. Cope, "Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy," Institute for National Defense 
Studies, October 2002 [web site]; available from 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dtic/ADA421906.pdf&code=6775d93a129d79b20ad200db97
99a0e0; Internet; accessed 23 July 2007, 2. 
83 Cope, 3. 
84 The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of 
American States made a study about the effects of using Glyphosate to eradicate coca 
plantations. Estudio de los efectos del Programa de Erradicación de Cultivos Ilícitos mediante la 
aspersión aérea con el herbicida Glifosato (PECIG) y de los cultivos ilícitos en la salud humana y 
en el medio ambiente [Study of the the Illicit Crops Eradication Program by aerial aspersion with 
glyphosate herbicide and of illicit crops on Human Health and on the Environment]. Organización 
de Estados Americanos [Organization of American States]. March 2005. [web site]; available from 
http://www.cicad.oas.org/es/glisfosatoInformeFinal.pdf; Internet; accessed 24 July 2007. 
 45
Many families in FARC-controlled rural areas, unable to travel to 
paramilitary-controlled towns, were going hungry.  Great numbers 
of people were leaving Putumayo, some across the border into 
Ecuador and others to plant coca elsewhere in the country.  Young 
people, lacking other economic opportunities, were volunteering to 
join the FARC or the paramilitaries.85 
Although aerial eradication is a successful and viable way to counter coca 
production, it has an adverse effect by alienating the population -- especially 
since there are no other means of subsistence to compensate for the loss of their 
food crops. 
2. Plan Colombia 
Plan Colombia is a six-year strategic plan developed by former Colombian 
President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002).  The purpose was "to end the country’s 
40-year-old armed conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote economic and 
social development."86  The Colombian government seized the initiative to 
develop this plan against the drug cartels to promote peace and economic 
stability, while increasing security to restore control of the state.  Plan Colombia 
is "an integral policy that looks to reiterate the commitment of the Colombian 
government to look for a negotiated political solution to the conflict, under 
fundamental basic principles such as democracy, territorial integrity and the 
defense and protection of human rights."87  The main objectives of the 
Colombian government have been to "promote peace and economic 
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development, and increase security."88  Addressing drug trafficking is, therefore, 
an integral part of achieving the government's objectives. 
Meanwhile, for the United States the objective of Plan Colombia is "to 
prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help 
Colombia promote peace and economic development because it contributes to 
regional security in the Andes."89  Nevertheless, the policy of the United States 
towards the Colombian government to fight drug trafficking has also evolved to 
support its fight against illegal armed groups.  As part of the expansion of the 
American support to its Colombian counterpart, "in 2002, the [Bush] 
Administration requested, and Congress approved, expanded authority to use 
U.S. counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking 
and terrorist organizations in Colombia."90  General Jackman of U.S. Southern 
Command said: 
Our main objective is to help transform the Colombian military to a 
force that is capable of defeating the terrorist organizations, 
establishing presence and defense, in order to provide a safe and 
secure environment and governance throughout Colombia.91 
Therefore in 2002, support from the United States broadened from 
counterdrugs to counterinsurgency when the United States Congress removed 
restrictions that constrained American resources and assets within Plan 
Colombia to support only counter drugs operations.  The decision of the 
American government to allow its Colombian counterpart, through its military and 
police, to use the American military aid and equipment to conduct operations 
against the FARC-EP, and other insurgent organizations, proved vital for the 
success and re-legitimization of the state.  The FARC-EP now see Plan  
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Colombia as a "threat to its funding sources and a direct military threat to the 
organization itself through the introduction of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in the 
region."92 
 
 ACI FMF NADR AirWing DoD Total 
FY2000 60.1 -- -- 38.0 128.5 226.6
P.L.106-246 832.0 -- -- -- 100.7 932.7
FY2001 48.0 -- -- 38.0 190.2 276.2
FY2002 379.9a -- 25.0 38.2 119.1 562.2
FY2003 580.2b 17.1 3.3 41.5 165.0 807.1
FY2004 473.9 98.5 .2 45.0 122.0 739.6
FY2005 462.8 99.2 4.1 45.0 200.0 811.1
FY2006 464.8 89.1 -- 45.0 112.0 710.9
FY2007 (request) 465.0 90.0 3.84 na na 558.8
Total 3,766.7 393.9 36.44 290.7 1,137.5 5,630.8
Table 1.   U.S. Assistance for Plan Colombia, FY2000-FY2006.93 
From: Colleen W. Cook. Colombia: Issues for Congress. CRS Report for 
Congress, 13 December 2006. Available from 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/crs/nps33-012307-
03.pdf&code=f704d7a899cee5f8bd7ef366fb1c3929; Internet; accessed 24 
September 2007, 29. 
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thereafter, Plan Colombia funds are assigned to the State Department’s International Narcotics 
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a. Includes $6 million appropriated to FMF but transferred to the ACI account. 
b. Includes $93 million in FMF regular appropriations and $20 million in FMF 
supplemental funds that were transferred to the ACI account. 
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Some analysts that have studied Plan Colombia, and the relationships of 
Colombia with other South American countries, have concluded that it has 
negatively affected the balance of military power.  Pina argues that "...the 
execution of Plan Colombia in its different phases has created a military 
imbalance between Colombia and Venezuela in areas such as Air Mobility, Air 
Interception, Close Air Support, Special Operation Units, and Air Defense."94  
Besides the assets provided by the United States to the Colombian Armed 
Forces as part of Plan Colombia, the most relevant aspect for its fight against the 
guerrillas has been the use of the American doctrine in its Counterinsurgency 
Operations.  One of the most relevant aspects has been intelligence collection: 
U.S. [military] aid has provided the Colombian military with 
improved signals intelligence (SIGINT).  Using this critical factor 
has guaranteed successful operations against guerrillas in 2003.  In 
sum, considerable experience, equipment, and intelligence sharing 
counter-insurgent and anti-drug roles have forged the Colombian 
Army, Air Force, Navy and National Police into a relatively 
professional and competent service, almost exclusively directed 
towards counter-guerrilla operations.95 
The use of the new capabilities developed by the Colombian military, with 
support from the United States, has allowed it to deal in a more effective and 
efficient manner with insurgent and terrorist organizations who challenge the 
authority of the state.  Next, the most significant insurgent and paramilitary 
groups that challenge the authority of the state, the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and 
the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) will be discussed. 
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3. Insurgent and Paramilitary Groups 
The geography of the country, reinforced by the ethnic and social divisions 
among the population, represents a constant challenge for the integration and 
consolidation of the Colombian population.  The task for the Colombian 
government has been further complicated by "a pronounced dispersion of power, 
manifested through extreme levels of localism and regionalism."96  These 
feelings among the population are further encouraged by the epic values that 
bond them together and alienate them from the ruling centralized aristocracy.  
Eventually, under the influence of external actors, some armed groups 
consolidated and challenged the incipient hegemony of the Colombian state.  
The most significant challenges for the Colombian state are the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP), the National Liberation 
Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).  The FARC-
EP and the ELN, despite their common objective of overthrowing the Colombian 
government and some attempts to unite their efforts, are currently engaged in a 
conflict where neither of them trusts the other.  Each one fights to expand its area 
of influence while protecting its own interests.  The origins of these ideological 
differences are related to the original leaders of the groups involved.  According 
to Nazih Richani, "the FARC’s leaders are predominantly drawn from the 
peasantry, whereas the ELN’s leaders are predominantly drawn from the urban 
middle class."97  At the same time, some members of the AUC's leadership were 
involved in narco-trafficking activities and were members of narco-bourgeoisie98 
society before assuming their role as anti-insurgents.  Empirical studies about the  
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origins of the constituencies of insurgents and paramilitaries have shown 
evidence of low levels of education of FARC and ELN members, compared to the 
education level of AUC members.99 
 
Figure 4.   Illegal armed groups and coca cultivation in Colombia, 2006. 
From: "Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey." United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime; available 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/icmp/colombia_2006_en_web.pdf; Internet; 
accessed 8 August 2007, 68. 
                                            
99 For more information about these studies, see: Richani, "Caudillos and the Crisis of the 
Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War System and the Privatisation [sic] of 
Counterinsurgency in Colombia," 414-415. 
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a. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejercito 
del Pueblo (FARC-EP) 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejercito del Pueblo -FARC-EP) 
were founded in 1966 by the Colombian Communist Party under the influence of 
Fidelista groups and on the basis of the independent peasant republic of 
Marquetalia.100  Initially, the FARC-EP was organized among the peasant 
population of the remote and isolated mountainous areas between Bogotá and 
Cali. 
This guerrilla organization has emerged to become Latin America’s 
oldest and most powerful guerrilla organization -- also recognized as "one of the 
largest and most well-funded militant organizations in the world."101  Since its 
beginning, the communist ideology has played a significant part in recruiting 
sympathizers and followers for the FARC.  The limited capability of the 
Colombian state to satisfy the demands of its population has helped the FARC-
EP to evolve from a guerrilla movement to a criminal institution.  For some 
people, it is the only viable option -- mainly peasants -- to escape poverty and to 
have a better way of life.  James Zackrison, Research Director for the Center for 
Hemispheric Defense Studies, identified institutionalization as the most 
significant characteristic of FARC, when he said: 
The FARC is unique [among] Latin American insurgencies in that it 
is institutionalized, that is, it is not dependent on one single leader It 
might be possible to negotiate with individual fronts, thus dividing 
the organization as a whole, but I’ve not seen any success in this 
regard to date.102 
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In the years prior to 1982, the FARC obtained financial resources 
from illicit activities, such as extortion, bank robberies, and kidnappings.103  
Despite the limited amount of resources that the organization was able to obtain 
from these activities, the supreme commander of the guerrillas, Manuel 
Marulanda Vélez, claimed the FARC-EP never received support from the Soviet 
Union or Cuba.  As the group searched for economic resources, it gravitated 
towards drug related activities.  The wide variety of illicit activities in which the 
group was involved was used to: 
Create and sustain a liberation army, recruited from marginalized 
parts of society and equipped to be capable of defeating security 
forces, controlling territory in order to isolate cities, undermining 
legitimacy of government at all levels, weakening societal will to 
resist, and ultimately winning the revolutionary struggle.104 
Initially, the rebel organizations offered protection to the drug 
plantations and shipments.  However, as the guerrilla movement became aware 
of the large profits and realized that they were already involved in illicit activities, 
they increased their demand for profits and, eventually, started growing their own 
drugs.  The relationship of the FARC-EP with drug trafficking organizations was 
such that as the "burgeoning enterprise grew explosively in the 1980's, the FARC 
expanded its territorial and military influence."105  Despite the profit obtained by 
both illicit organizations, their lack of common interests and objectives led to their 
breakup.  The most relevant ideological disjuncture was synthesized because 
narco-trafficking kingpins considered themselves to be part of the legitimate 
capitalist bourgeoisie of Colombia -- while the FARC's ideology was mainly 
socialist.106  Finally, on May 29, 2003, the president of the United States, George 
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W. Bush, under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, designated the 
FARC-EP as a Significant Foreign Narcotics Trafficker.107 
During the 1990s, the FARC-EP became significantly stronger and 
capable of effectively challenging the Colombian state.  According to some 
Colombian analysts’ estimates, the FARC-EP receives over $300 million annually 
from narcotics trafficking.108  During this decade, the FARC implemented its 
comprehensive strategic plan denouncing the Bolivarian Campaign for a New 
Colombia.  This allowed it to attain the peak of its influence and power within the 
country.  Within this strategic plan, the FARC-EP increased its level of activity 
against the state in an effort to destabilize it and diminish its legitimacy.  Thus, 
began a state of general insurrection among the population.  Also as part of this 
strategic plan, the FARC-EP officially separated from the Communist Party and 
organized a new political party named the Colombian Clandestine Communist 
Party (PCCC).  The FARC-EP grew so much with drug related money, that it 
posed a great challenge to the Colombian state.  As Saskiewicz describes it, "by 
1996, the FARC-EP’s victories against the Colombian military would become so 
definitive that many domestic and foreign observers would predict the imminent 
fall of the central government."109  The guerrilla movement gained further 
presence throughout the country by exploiting the limited capability of the state to 
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As part of the FARC-EP's strategy to further its offensive against 
the Colombian state, it chose to engage in peace talks with President Andrés 
Pastrana.  As a precondition to participate in such talks, the FARC-EP demanded 
that the government ceded five FARC-controlled municipalities in south-central 
Colombia, -- 42,139 square kilometers -- to create a demilitarized zone known as 
Zona de Despeje. 
 
Figure 5.   Former Distention Zone and current Rehabilitation Zones. 
From: Informe Anual del Alto Comisionado sobre DDHH en Colombia en 2001.  
[2001 Annual Report from the High Commissioner of Human Rights in Colombia]. 
Office of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in Colombia, 
February 2003. Available from 
http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/informe2
002.html; Internet; accessed 30 July 2007. 
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In theory, this agreement between the government and the guerrilla 
was meant to provide an incentive to develop a political and a territorial space for 
negotiations between both parties.  In practice, the FARC-EP used the 
demilitarized zone as a safe haven for its illicit activities -- specifically drug 
production, weapon smuggling, hostage holding, training, and directing attacks 
against the Colombian military outside this area.110  Although a demilitarized 
zone was established, the FARC-EP maintained the deployment of its guerrilla 
forces throughout the rest of the country.  The interest of the Colombian 
government to attain peace is evidenced by two trips that President Pastrana 
made to the demilitarized zone to sustain talks with guerrilla leaders.111  
President Pastrana was severely criticized for the concessions that he made to 
the guerrillas.  The level of disagreement and criticism of Pastrana is evident by 
the fact that "in May 1999, Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Lloreda resigned 
and sixteen army generals offered their resignations, criticizing Pastrana for 
excessive concessions to the guerrillas and the continued extension of the 
demilitarized zone."112 
The tipping point that marked the failure of the peace process came 
on February 20, 2002 with "the hijacking of a civilian aircraft and the kidnapping 
of one passenger, Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay, head of the Senate 
Commission on Peace and member of a large and politically prominent 
family.."113  This event prompted President Pastrana to announce the end of the 
process and to order Colombian armed forces to retake the demilitarized zone 
that had been given over to the FARC-EP as a goodwill gesture to start the 
peace process.114  Pastrana's decision was intended to reestablish control in the 
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demilitarized zone, reaffirm the authority of the state, and deny safe haven to the 
guerrilla organization.  Although difficult to assess, it is certain that this measure 
impacted the ability of the organization to continue their illicit operations.  Despite 
the large amounts of money earned from drug related activities, it appears that 
the insurgent movement remains ideologically committed.  According to its 
declarations and documents, the strategic objectives of the FARC-EP include 
"the defeat of the Colombian military, the toppling of the central government, and 
the establishment of a regime founded on Marxist-Leninist and 'Bolivarian' 
principles."115 
The conviction of its constituency and the support from the 
population represent two fundamental aspects for the survival of any insurgency  
The FARC-EP adopted three strategies to deal with these issues.  The first 
strategy, designed to maintain the support and cohesion of its constituency, was 
adopted to terminate resentment and prevent schism among the members of the 
group.  The FARC-EP formalized this strategy by declaring a penal code known 
as the Reglamento de Régimen Disciplinario.116  This document is "used to 
discipline rank and file guerrillas and to instill a strict sense of military discipline 
firmly rooted in fear."117  The second strategy, constantly applied and adapted 
since the formation of the group, is designed to win the support of the population.  
This strategy redresses the social injustices, such as the unfair distribution of 
land and the lack of state presence in rural areas, to attract the interest of the 
rural and marginalized population.  The FARC-EP has also succeeded in 
attracting women to join its cause -- especially among sectors of the society 
where women live in precarious conditions or are subjugated by the social order -
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- by offering a way to fight against social injustice.  The third strategy is a variant 
of the second strategy as it is also designed to win the support of the population.  
Nevertheless, while the second strategy addresses some the interests of the 
population, the third strategy deals with fear and coercion. 
The FARC-EP has distinguished itself by using coercive violence 
against small isolated communities and by exploiting the limited capability of the 
Colombian government to apply the rule of law.  The insurgent group has also 
taken advantage of the diminished presence of government authorities to 
threaten and coerce municipal authorities and to weaken the presence of the 
Colombian state in rural areas.  In some cases, mayors from districts located in 
areas with departments with a strong guerrilla presence, have opted to resign or 
simply abandon their jobs.118 
The FARC-EP is also responsible for kidnappings and murders to 
deter the population from denouncing the presence of the guerrillas.  In some 
cases the FARC-EP has resorted to forcible recruitment and herding villagers 
together at gunpoint.  In most cases, the group uses subtle pressures backed by 
thinly veiled threats to induce and persuade people to join the movement.119  The 
FARC-EP has also gained unpopular attention for recruiting and using minors 
under the age of eighteen as combatants against the Colombian government.  
According to estimates from Human Rights Watch, over 7,400 minors currently 
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FARC-EP constitutes a violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child which forbids children under the age of 
fifteen from taking part in warfare.121 
In summary, the FARC-EP has exploited many of the weaknesses 
of the Colombian state.  This allows the group to exert some degree of control 
over significant parts of the Colombian territory. 
b. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 
In 1964, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional -ELN) was founded as a pro-Cuban revolutionary guerrilla group.  It 
was inspired by Che Guevara and led by Fabio Vasquez Castaño.  The ELN is 
the smaller of the two main Marxist guerrilla organizations active in Colombia.  
However, the ELN is a Marxist-Leninist group with origins in the country’s 
university campuses.  The urban-educated origins of the ELN, unlike those of the 
FARC, somehow limit the appeal and social base of the group among rural, 
uneducated sectors of the population. 
Since its beginning, the ELN has had a strong religious influence 
brought about by several priests that were inspired by a Liberation Theology.122  
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The priests decided to support and adopt the rebel cause of the group.123  During 
the 1970s, the ELN was repeatedly defeated by the Colombian military.  
Nevertheless, the group reemerged under the joint-leadership of Father Manuel 
Pérez alias El Cura Pérez and Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, alias Gabino.  This 
legacy of priestly influence played a significant role in initially limiting the 
involvement of the ELN in drug related activities based on moral grounds.  
Nevertheless, as time passed and the religious influence diminished, the group 
has become increasingly involved with drugs.  According to some estimates of 
Colombian analysts, the ELN receives over $200 million annually from narcotics 
trafficking.124 
Other analysts argue that the ELN relies more on "kidnapping and 
extortion for its funding."125  Kidnapping is such a relevant source of income for 
the group that the ELN is responsible for most kidnappings that happen in the 
country.  One of the most persistent demands of the ELN has been the 
nationalization of the Colombian petroleum sector to distribute the wealth among 
the population.126  The ELN's preferred tactics are to attack the country's 
electrical grid, oil wells, and pipelines within an area.  Attacking the country's oil 
infrastructure has had significant economic, environmental, and social 
repercussions. 
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The ELN has also benefited from the Colombian government's 
struggle with the FARC.  The ELN tried to follow the precedent set forth by the 
FARC-EP by negotiating a demilitarized zone with the Pastrana administration.  
Civil resistance played a significant role and, ultimately, prevented the 
government from ceding the Middle Magdalena region to the ELN.127  Despite 
the failed peace process between the FARC and the Colombian government, the 
ELN retained certain legitimacy among marginalized sectors of the population. 
After losing its religious influence and becoming much more like 
insurgent guerrillas, the group adopted similar strategies to those developed by 
the FARC-EP to win and retain the sympathy of the population and deter it from 
supporting the government.  The ELN, in a similar way to the FARC-EP, also 
uses so-called “war councils” to decide whether to execute an accused or to 
impose a reduced sentence.  There is no evidence that such trials are fair as 
required by international humanitarian law.  Organizations that have researched 
these procedures claim that these trials are in fact, “summary executions dressed 
up as judicial proceedings and are abhorrent violations of international 
humanitarian law.”128  The ELN also uses Information Operation strategies to 
maintain the support of the population by blaming "foreign oil companies for weak 
domestic economies, endemic poverty, and severe income inequality.”129  The 
ELN demands the nationalization of the oil industry and the redistribution of the 
wealth generated by this activity among the marginalized sectors of the 
Colombian population.  The ELN also tries to gain the support of women by 
offering to address their grievances caused by social injustices and inequality.  
However, there is evidence of exploitation and abuse of women, particularly 
minors, within the ranks of this guerrilla organization -- despite the supposed 
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interest to improve their social situation.130  The ELN routinely uses repression 
and intimidation against the population.  Overall, even though the ELN is smaller 
than the FARC-EP, it uses similar tactics to maximize its impact on the 
population and finance its fight against the Colombian state. 
c. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) 
The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia -AUC) appeared in 1997 in response to the inability of the 
Colombian state to protect the population from guerrilla groups -- mainly the 
FARC-EP and the ELN.  The AUC tends to operate primarily in areas where the 
state has insufficient military strength to prevent and counter insurgent activities.  
According to John Cope, the autodefensas do not seek to overthrow the 
government.  Instead, they come forward in areas where the state is unable to 
protect the population, its property, and interests.  As a result, many people see 
them as their only source of protection from insurgent aggression.  Despite their 
propensity for violence, some Colombians see them as the only alternative to 
defeat the guerrillas.131 
The emerging narco-bourgeoisie played a significant role in the 
formation of this paramilitary group.  In the initial stages, the narco-bourgeoisie, 
the Colombian army, and the paramilitaries "were junior partners in the 
paramilitary project, but were acquiring significant strength in the second part of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, reaching their zenith by the end of the decade."132  
This dynamic was not new since it is common practice for Colombian landowners 
to have private armies, or security forces, to protect their family and property.  
The AUC is different from its predecessors: it became a paramilitary federation of 
local and regional paramilitary groups whose main purpose was to counter the 
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expanding guerrilla groups.  This paramilitary group emerged at a time when the 
authority of the Colombian state was in jeopardy and its inability to counter the 
growing guerrilla threat was in question.  Despite the fact that the Colombian 
government declared the paramilitaries illegal in 1989, some sectors of the 
government and the military continued to view them as a useful tool to counter 
the guerrillas.  There have been accusations that the government uses 
paramilitaries to fight insurgencies outside the legal framework and without 
respect for humanitarian law. 
Despite the alleged relationship between the Colombian 
government and the paramilitaries, there is no evidence that the government 
directly finances the paramilitaries.  In 2006, investigations of the Colombian 
government unveiled evidence of a relationship between politicians and 
paramilitaries.  In early 2007, "the Supreme Court ordered the arrest of Senators 
Álvaro García and Jairo Merlano and Congressman Eric Morris for links to 
paramilitary groups."133  These cases became evidence of the infiltration of the 
paramilitaries into the country’s political environment.  At the lower levels, the 
AUC has intimidated and controlled local politicians in certain regions to gain 
access to public funds.  Even with the involvement of the paramilitaries in politics, 
the most significant source of income for the AUC continues to be drug related 
money. 
The Department of State estimates that “as much as seventy 
percent of the paramilitary operational costs are financed with drug-related 
earnings.”134  In the past, the degree of involvement in drug related activities 
became a source of disagreement among paramilitary groups.  In an effort to 
settle the differences among its constituency, the leader of the AUC decided to 
reject the involvement of the group in drug trade and prohibited the use of 
paramilitary protection for cocaine shipments.  Nevertheless, the AUC decided to 
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continue taxing "cocaine producers in zones controlled by the paramilitary forces 
in order to fund its organization."135  Despite the fact that drug related activities 
are a source of finance for the AUC, the group also receives significant amounts 
of money for providing protection.  Private landowners hire the AUC to protect 
them from kidnappings by guerrillas.  The group also obtains funds from extorting 
private-sector companies, ranchers, and other individuals.  The most recent and 
publicized example was the case of Chiquita Brands International, who “pled 
guilty to charges that its Colombian representatives or those of its Colombian 
associates or partners had made payments to paramilitaries that totaled as much 
as $1.7 million over several years.”136 
Therefore, "the AUC has a financial incentive for the current fighting 
in Colombia to continue."137  The AUC has repeatedly tried to use the efforts of 
the Colombian government to demobilize the paramilitaries to negotiate political 
recognition.  Even though in the past, the AUC reached an agreement with the 
Colombian government to demobilize its troops, the group continues to murder, 
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Although the overall level of AUC violence decreased, according to 
the State Department report, cease-fire violations have included 
mass killings, kidnappings, assassinations, illegal evictions, 
robberies, and impressment [sic] of children.139 
The strategy of the AUC and other paramilitary groups to obtain 
support from the population resides essentially on their claim of protecting the 
people from the guerrillas.  This assertion gains credibility and is further 
strengthened by the perception of the population that the government lacks the 
capacity to apply the rule of law and exercise the monopoly of the use of force.  
The AUC creates fear among the population and, in sympathizing sectors, gains 
credibility by searching out and killing peasants whom they accuse of 
collaborating with FARC.140 
In general, the AUC has exploited and profited from the fact that the 
resources of the Colombian government are stretched thin.  The AUC continues 
to make threats, induce violence, and use extortion to maintain its label as a 
paramilitary force. 
4. Colombian Government Response 
President Álvaro Uribe Vélez141, as part of its National Development Plan 
Hacia un Estado Comunitario 2002-2006 [Towards a Common State], developed 
a national security doctrine known as Política de Defensa y Seguridad 
Democrática [Democratic Security and Defense Policy -DSDP], as "an instrument 
to guarantee public liberties, defeat violence and reestablish the confidence of 
citizens in the action of the state."142  The DSDP defined the Colombian 
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government strategy to fight and defeat terrorism, highlighting that the principle 
objective of democratic security is to strengthen the rule of law while protecting 
each citizen.143 
This policy identifies six main threats to Colombian society: terrorism; illicit 
drugs trade; illicit finances; weapons, ammunitions, and explosives trafficking; 
kidnap and extortion; and homicide.144  Since all these issues relate to public 
security, the Colombian government strengthened its military and the National 
Police.  In an effort to provide a more comprehensive approach to the problem, 
the Colombian government supported this strategy by taking actions to address 
social issues and improve governance. 
a. Plan of Action 
The Colombian government's response was structured around a 
long-term war plan known as Plan Patriota 2004.145  The plan focused on five 
main strategies: transforming the Colombian Armed Forces; countering drug 
production and trafficking; fighting insurgency and paramilitaries; taking care of 
social problems; and improving governance and control of territory -- particularly 
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(1)  Transforming the Colombian Armed Forces.  The 
transformation of the Colombian Armed forces began during the administration of 
President Andrés Pastrana146 and has continued under the administration of 
President Álvaro Uribe.  As part of this transformation, the Colombian military 
forces, together with the National Police have continued to grow, receive better 
training, education, equipment, and placed an emphasis on professionalism. 
The Colombian government passed new laws to support the 
increase of the security forces.  To finance the increase of the troop strength and 
capabilities of the Colombian military, the government established a one-time 
"war tax."147  The United States' government and military also play a role in 
modernizing and reforming the Colombian Armed Forces.  In addition to 
providing economic support to the Colombian government,148 the United States 
assisted the Colombian military in creating, training, and equipping three counter-
narcotics battalions and one brigade charged with providing security to the Caño 
Limón – Coveñas oil pipeline.149 
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Figure 6.   Colombian Military Forces and National Police, 1998-2007. 
From: Presidencia República de Colombia. "Logros de la Política de 
Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática - PCSD [Achievements of the 
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(2)  Countering Drug Production and Trafficking.  These 
activities have been issues for the Colombian government since coca growers 
from Peru brought the techniques and knowledge of how to enhance the 
production of coca.  Despite the vast support of the United States, eliminating 
drug trafficking is a very complex issue.  Countering drug related activities is an 
enormous challenge because of the considerable amounts of money involved. 
(3)  Fighting Insurgency and Paramilitaries.  These actions 
are the fundamental responsibility of the Colombian military and the national 
police.  This responsibility is one of the most challenging due to the groups’ 
experience and skills they have developed fighting the government and 
 68
themselves.  The United States assumed a more crucial role supporting this fight 
through the Colombia Antiterrorism Act of 2002.  In this document, the U.S. 
Congress expresses its "support for a unified campaign against illicit narcotics 
trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to the national security of 
Colombia,"150 as well as by removing existing restrictions of Plan Colombia.  
Meanwhile, the military took additional actions to gain the support of the 
population.  One of these actions was the creation of anti-kidnapping units that 
work closely with the National Police.  Countering kidnapping has increased the 
support and trust for the government and its institutions by the population 
because they now feel protected from guerrilla and paramilitary actions.151 
The Colombian military has gained vast experience from 
more than four decades fighting insurgencies and two decades of struggles 
against drug-related activities.  Despite the experience of the Colombian military, 
the strategy of wearing down the insurgents is “indeed expensive in terms of 
time, resources, political endurance, and individual and institutional sacrifices.”152  
As a result, the Colombian military has developed strategies to maximize 
population support, while increasing security and governance.  The Colombian 
military also decided to strengthen its intelligence capabilities.  Intelligence based 
operations, known as "integral action" by the Colombian military, avoids the 
unnecessary alienation of the population.  As part of this strategy, the Army 
created the General Coordination Action Division.  This division’s objectives were 
handling the flow of information -- internal and external -- as well as 
psychological operations.  Military and civilian experts on psychological 
operations and communications worked together to integrate and improve the 
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internal and external communications processes.  The military understood the 
potential benefits from developing an appropriate relationship with national and 
international media.  This military liaison became the primary means of 
information for the population about what the Army was doing and how it was 
doing it.  Eventually, these efforts succeeded in gaining national and international 
support for the work done by the Colombian military.153  As Don Snider and Lloyd 
Matthews describe it, the Army recognized that: 
National security in democracies is conducted within the context of 
civil-military relationships, these civil-military relationships 
necessarily have a specific structure that channels participants’ 
competencies and responsibilities in order to maximize security at 
the least cost to democratic principles.154 
The Colombian Ministry of Defense also implemented the 
program Red de Cooperantes to foster the cooperation between the states' 
security services and the population.  This improved the relationship and the flow 
of information to the public security forces.155 
(4)  Taking Care of Social Problems.  The Colombian 
government has put into practice several social programs to take care of social 
issues and demands of the population.  These programs are framed within the 
strategies of the National Development Plan Hacia un Estado Comunitario 2002-
2006 and its successor, Estado Comunitario: Desarrollo para Todos 2006-2010 
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[Common state: Development for Everyone],156 developed by the Uribe 
administration.  Among the most relevant and successful programs is Familias en 
accion.  This program grants subsidies for food and education to the poorest 
homes and to displaced populations.157  Another successful social program is 
Red Juntos, an integral strategy coordinated by different government institutions 
to improve the living conditions of the families who live in extreme poverty.158 
Four decades of insurgencies in Colombia have taken a 
huge toll on the society.  One of the most difficult and delicate issues for the 
Colombian people has been to deal with summary executions and mass graves.  
For this, the Colombian government created the Unit of Justice and Peace under 
the Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía).  This Unit is in charge of exhuming mass 
grave sites that are revealed by insurgents that have been granted amnesty.  As 
of May 2007, the Unit of Justice and Peace had received information of more 
than 3,710 gravesites.159 
(5)  Improving Governance and Control of Territory.  
Improving governance is a priority for the Colombian government to regain 
control of territories with guerrilla and paramilitary presence.  The Democratic 
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Security and Defense Policy is designed to recover authority with legitimacy, 
legality, and governance, while simultaneously generating confidence among the 
population and strengthening the political system.160  The Colombian Presidency 
directly coordinates the actions of the different agencies involved through the 
Integral Action Coordination Center.161  Colombia's ambassador to the United 
States, Carolina Barco, declared that the Colombian government is "planning to 
invest more than $1.6 billion over the next four years in development projects to 
help maintain 'territorial control'."162 
The Colombian government has taken a multi-dimensional 
approach to solve the challenges of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers, 
while simultaneously dealing with social issues and grievances deep-rooted in 
Colombian society.  Instead of focusing solely on the use of force, the 
government has opted to use an integral approach to enhance the effective 
employment of its national security resources. 
b. Results 
The administration of President Álvaro Uribe has taken important 
actions to counter the threat of illegal armed groups that operate illegitimately 
within the country and to eradicate drug related activities.  The central part of 
these actions focuses on a broad set of policies and reforms destined to address 
some of the origins of the problems. 
To gain better insight into the response and results obtained by the 
Colombian state, we apply McCormick's Model of Insurgency and 
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Counterinsurgency.  It is important to remember that although drug related 
activities represent a significant challenge to the Colombian government, this 
study focuses on the financing of insurgencies and paramilitaries.  In this case, 
the four basic actors in McCormick's Mystic Diamond are: 
¾ The state -- represented by Colombian government, 
¾ The population -- is the center of gravity and whose support is the 
main objective of the state and the counterstate, 
¾ The counterstate -- represented by the guerrilla insurgencies who 
want to overthrow the state, 
¾ The international actors -- represented by those states who have 
actively supported either the legitimate government in its fight 
against the insurgency or the counterstate in its struggle against the 
state.  In this case, the most important ally has been the United 
States.  Meanwhile, Cuba and Venezuela have stood out as the 




Figure 7.   McCormick's model of insurgency applied to Colombia. 
After: Gordon H. McCormick, Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare Lecture Notes, 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Summer Quarter 2006). 
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Although very difficult to measure or quantify, the Colombian 
government has had significant success in countering the threat of the illegal 
armed groups.  One of the most significant and recognizable successes of the 
Uribe administration has been its ability to frame the response of the state to the 
guerrillas, paramilitaries, and other organizational threats as against the law.  
The Colombian military and the national police have emphasized the relevance 
of respecting human rights and acting in accordance with humanitarian law.  This 
strategy improved the image of the military and the police among the population, 
while legitimizing the response of the state through its institutions.  The following 
chart illustrates Colombia's public perception of various groups and institutions: 
 
Figure 8.   Colombian population's perception of groups and institutions. 
From: Presidencia República de Colombia. "Logros de la Política de 
Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática - PCSD [Achievements of the 
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Legitimacy has played a fundamental role in the demobilization 
process of guerrillas and paramilitaries.  The legitimacy of the state’s response 
has forced the guerrillas and paramilitaries to further enforce discipline among 
their ranks to discourage desertions.  The government's demobilization program 
has been very successful.  In fact, the program has become an essential tool of 
its response against the counterstate.  This program directly targets the 
counterstate's supporters and constituents.  By demobilizing guerrillas, the 
government directly affects the guerrilla's objective of "accumulating forces in 
order to shift their guerrilla campaign to conventional warfare, as they did from 
1998 to 2002."163 
According to statistics from the Presidency of Colombia, between 
August 2006 and May 2007, 1,554 people demobilized voluntarily.  This totals 
42,935 guerillas that have demobilized during the first term of President Álvaro 
Uribe.164  The Colombian government also established the High Council for 
Reintegration in order to aid and support demobilized people in their reintegration 
to civil society. 
In spite of the obvious success, the demobilization program has 
been criticized for not differentiating among the different types of guerrillas and 
their degrees of commitment in their struggle against the state.  Despite the 
success disbanding the paramilitary United Self-Defence Force, which consisted 
of approximately 32,000 paramilitaries, critics claim that there are new armed 
groups that are emerging with similar characteristics of paramilitary groups.  
According to the International Crisis Group: 
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Since early 2006, the Organization of American States (OAS) 
Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OEA), human rights 
groups and civil society organisations [sic] have insistently warned 
about the rearming of demobilized [sic] paramilitary units, the 
continued existence of groups that did not disband because they 
did not participate in the government-AUC negotiations and the 
merging of former paramilitary elements with powerful criminal 
organizations…165 
The Colombian government has also been criticized for responding 
in a softer way to the paramilitary threat -- compared to its response to the 
guerrilla threat.  This has further encouraged accusations that the Uribe 
administration is, to some degree, connected to the paramilitaries and, thus, 
protects them.  Nevertheless, these accusations lack supporting evidence and 
are solely intended to discredit the Uribe administration. 
Another strategy of the Colombian government to counter the 
guerrillas and the paramilitaries has been the transformation of public security 
institutions and the development of social programs that offer the population 
employment opportunities.  These actions significantly contributed to the 
improvement of security throughout the country in addition to gaining popular 
support.  According to statistics from the Colombian Presidency, security around 
the country increased significantly during the last five years.166 
The Colombian government has insistently promoted public 
diplomacy campaigns to gain international support and expose the nature of the 
guerrillas.  This campaign has succeeded in obtaining the support of the 
population -- particularly in Europe where some governments have been known 
to accept the illegitimacy of terrorists.  On March 20, 2006, the Council of the 
European Union officially designated the FARC, ELN and AUC as terrorist 
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organizations.167  This designation constitutes a major achievement for the 
Colombian government since it impedes the financing of these groups by 
European NGOs.  According to Sabine Kurtenbach, this designation "was 
significant, because it meant that members of these groups were criminalized: 
they were not allowed to hold public meetings inside Europe (where the ELN had 
support), and their financial assets were frozen."168 
The Colombian government has taken significant actions to 
address social grievances.  These actions have been supported by strategies to 
diminish and disrupt the contact between the population and the guerrilla.  The 
Colombian military has played an essential role in the conflict to counter the 
guerrillas and paramilitaries.  The current Information Operations effort in 
Colombia has centered on the following main points: 
¾ Framing the response of the state to the guerrillas, paramilitaries, 
and other organizational threats as against the law; 
¾ Emphasizing respect for human rights and acting in accordance 
with humanitarian law; significantly improving the image of the 
military and the police among the population while legitimizing the 
response of the state; 
¾ Targeting the counterstate's supporters and constituents through 
demobilization programs to undermine the guerrilla's objective of 
shifting to from a guerrilla campaign to conventional warfare; 
¾ Professionalizing public security institutions and developing social 
programs to offer employment opportunities to the population; 
¾ Promoting public diplomacy campaigns to gain international support 
and expose the nature of the guerrillas. 
The use of Information Operations by the Colombian military has 
optimized the use of its human and material assets and restored the confidence 
of the population while reinstating the rule of law in the country.  Although the 
                                            
167 European Union, "Council Common Position 2006/231/CFSP of 20 March 2006," Official 
Journal of the European Union, 21 March 2006 [web site]; available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_082/l_08220060321en00200024.pdf; Internet; 
accessed 29 September 2007. 
168 Sabine Kurtenbach, "Europe and the Colombian Conflict." Inter-American Dialogue, June 
2005 [web site]; available from http://www.colombiainternacional.org/Doc%20PDF/SR-
EuropeColombianConflict.pdf; Internet; accessed 30 September 2007, 6. 
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Colombian state has had major successes against the counterstate, the fight is 
far from over.  Social inequalities continue to haunt the Colombian society, and 
some sectors of the population still see illegal armed groups as a viable source of 
income.  It is necessary for the Colombian government, and particularly its 
military, to retain the confidence of the population and maintain them as an ally in 
the fight against the counterstate. 
B. CASE STUDY: MEXICO 
Mexico is located directly south of the United States and acts as the 
southern access portal for everything entering the United States -- both legal and 
illegal.  Its vast geography and population is divided by the Sierra Madre 
Mountains.  Mexico is a democracy based on a congressional system founded 
on the Constitution of 1917.  Although Mexico traditionally elects to maintain its 
foreign interest abroad, it maintains its vocal presence among Latin American 
countries. 
Mexico’s criminal threat has drastically evolved over the past several 
decades.  Though national leftists and drug cartels have always posed 
challenges to the Mexican government, they have recently flourished in light of 
9/11 and as a result of the U.S.-led crackdown on Colombian drug cartels.  
Insurgencies have also taken arms against the state by waging mass media 
campaigns and using terrorist-like tactics to instill fear in Mexico’s population.  
These insurgencies have transitioned from revolutionary nationalist to aggressive 
neo-liberal, greatly increasing the threat to Mexico's national security.169 
This portion of this thesis will highlight the rise in criminal activity in Mexico 
that warrants an unconventional military strategy.  We will define Mexico’s 
increasing drug problems and investigate the two main Marxist insurgencies that 
challenge Mexico’s political ideologies and national security. 
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Figure 9.   Physical map of Mexico. 
From: "Physical map of Mexico." Available 
http://www.freeworldmaps.net/northamerica/mexico/map.html; Internet; accessed 
12 October 2007. 
1. Drug Trafficking 
Mexico’s geographic location serves as a double-edged sword.  Its close 
proximity to the United States facilitates free trade agreements resulting in ninety 
percent of Mexican goods being consumed by the United States.  The same 
proximity and trade flow encourages illicit markets and trade from surrounding 
Latin American countries.  Colombian drug cartels have delegated much of the 
transportation risks to the Mexican drug cartels.  As a result, Mexican drug 






The drug problems in Mexico are centered first and foremost around 
smuggling.  According to the U.S. Department of State, Mexico continues to be 
the principal transit route for drugs from South to North America.170  The four 
principal illicit drugs that flow into the United States from Mexico are cocaine, 
heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine.  The bulk of cocaine destined for the 
U.S. market comes through Mexico and it is the major supplier of the heroin 
consumed in the United States.  In addition, Mexico is the principal foreign 
source of marijuana and methamphetamine.  As a result, drug trafficking has 
become Mexico’s largest illicit employer and also the largest source of hard 
currency.  The table below shows the empirical data of illicit drugs flowing into 
the United States from 2000 thru 2006. 
                                            
170 U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico," Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 25 February 2000. Available from 
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Table 2.   Estimated Amounts of Illicit Drugs Transiting Mexico, Produced in Mexico, 
and Seized in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico Border, Calendar years 
2000-2006.171 
                                            
171 Notes: Table with information from The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement; 
the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, National Drug Intelligence Center, the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Crime and Narcotics Center, ONDCP, and the El Paso Intelligence Center. 
a. The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM) estimates the metric tons 
of cocaine departing South America and flowing through the transit zone towards the 
United States. It also estimates what percentage of this amount is flowing towards 
Mexico for transshipment to the United States and reports seizures of cocaine in the 
transit zone. To estimate the amount of cocaine available in Mexico for transshipment 
to the United States, we multiplied the IACM’s total estimate of cocaine flowing 
towards the United States by the IACM’s estimated percentage of what was flowing 
towards Mexico (which ranged from 66 percent in 2000 to 90 percent in 2004 and 
2005). We then subtracted the IACM’s reported cocaine seizures and disruptions in 
the eastern Pacific Ocean, western Caribbean Sea, and Central America for each 
year to estimate how much cocaine was available to transit Mexico. Because of the 
uncertain nature of the estimates involved, we rounded the figures we derived to the 
nearest “ten.” 
b. Includes $93 million in FMF regular appropriations and $20 million in FMF 
supplemental funds that were transferred to the ACI account. 
c. DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center (and the IACM) defines drug seizures at the U.S. 
southwest border to include seizures at the U.S.-Mexico border or within 150 miles 
on the U.S. side of the border, including 88 border counties in Arizona, California, 
New Mexico, and Texas. 
d. This estimate does not include heroin that is produced in Colombia and may transit 
Mexico on the way to the United States. 
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From: United States Government Accountability Office, "Drug Control: U.S. 
Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit 
Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States," GAO Report to Congressional 
Requesters, August 2007. Available from 
http://www.offnews.info/downloads/d071018.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 October 
2007, 11. 
The large amounts of money that drug trafficking generates 
contributes to government and police corruption.  Mexico’s elected officials, 
police, judiciary, and sometimes military, are all plagued by corruption.  It was 
recently revealed that the famous Arellano-Felix drug cartel generated more 
income than the entire Drug Enforcement Agency’s annual budget.  In fact, the 
Arellano-Felix brothers were known for purposely sending illegal shipments into 
the United States and alerting authorities just to give law enforcement a sense of 
accomplishment in that they were doing their jobs by seizing illegal drug 
shipments.  Despite the recent capture of one of the Arellano-Felix cartel leaders, 
this cartel has topped the FBI and DEA's most wanted lists for several years.  
However, they continue to be responsible for multiple political and police 
assassinations. 
The United States has the largest population of drug users in the 
world and it is no wonder that the U.S. considers Mexico (and Colombia) a 
crucial crossroad in its own counter-drug war.  As a result, U.S. anti-drug policies 
and funding drive much of Mexico’s anti-drug policies.  The table below shows 
the number of U.S. agencies as well as the financial support that each 
contributes to Mexico in support of the counter-drug war.  Clearly, this amount of 
support encourages Mexico to focus their efforts to combat large-scale 









Table 3.   U.S. Agencies’ Support for Mexican Counternarcotics Activities, Fiscal 
Years 2000-2006.172 
From: United States Government Accountability Office, "Drug Control: U.S. 
Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit 
Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States," GAO Report to Congressional 
Requesters, August 2007. Available from 




                                            
172 Notes: Table with information from GAO analysis of Defense, Justice, State, and USAID 
data. 
a. Defense does not track obligations by country; thus these figures reflect estimated 
expenditures in Mexico during fiscal years 2000-2006. 
b. IMET is funded through State’s foreign operations appropriation but provided by 
Defense. Since 2002, Defense also funded training through the Counter Terrorism 
Fellowship program. 
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There is no doubt that the nearly $400 million dollars has impacted 
Mexico’s drug markets.  However the conventional strategy used by both Mexico 
and U.S. authorities has yet to disable drug trafficking and disrupt illegal drug 
trade flow from South to North America.  Perhaps an indirect approach consisting 
of psychological operations using information warfare tactics would help halt drug 
traffickers at the borders of Mexico.  Otherwise, enlisting the help of the 
population will remain a challenge since drug cartels can offer so much more 
monetary compensations than both the U.S. and Mexican governments 
combined.  Mexico must develop an unconventional and indirect approach to 
counter the increasing drug problems it faces.  Ignoring this, could be a detriment 
to future free trade agreements. 
2. Insurgent and Paramilitary Groups 
Although some scholars argue that Mexico has experienced a social 
revolution since the turn of the century, formal insurgencies have existed in 
Mexico -- specifically in the state in Chiapas -- since 1965.173  Mexico has 
developed several programs to deal with these various peasant movements, 
which have recently taken on the form of violent terrorists.  However, not much 
has changed for Mexico’s troubled areas.  Poverty, land conflicts, citizen 
inequality, and political discontent continue to invigorate indigenous populations.  
As government programs with good intentions are implemented, they are 
undermined by local elites that seek personal gain and re-direct the much 
needed funds.  Nevertheless, these programs focus on the observable socio-
economic issues rather than attacking the root causes. 
It is often assumed that those with the lowest standard of living will 
engage in criminal activity.  In Mexico, Chiapas is the poorest state and Mexico’s 
method of dealing with the various peasant movements is to throw money at the 
                                            
173 Neil Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy, (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1998), Annex A. 
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situation.174  Hence, prior to 1994, Chiapas received more funds per capita than 
any other state.  However, root socio-economic issues were either ignored or 
overlooked which makes it difficult to provide realistic solutions to genuine 
problems.  Consequently, Mexico’s strategies in Chiapas have been counter 
productive since the 1980s, provoking divisions within peasant movements and 
in some cases leading to the emergence of new ones.175 
Mexico’s poverty-ridden dilemma also gives rise to an anti-globalization 
climate that generates peasant movements.  These groups assume Marxist-like 
characteristics and associate globalization with an imperialistic (Western) regime.  
As a result, they adopt terrorist mentalities and tactics to counter the double 
standards of modernization and Western influence.  Mexico’s most obvious case 
of anti-globalization is the Zapatista movement that arose in the southern region 
of Mexico -- Chiapas. 
Mexico's current policy allows the Mexican military to support civil 
authorities to counter insurgencies.  Although there are over one hundred self-
proclaimed insurgencies in over twenty-two states,176 Mexico's National Defense 
Secretariat recognizes only nine official insurgent groups.  These groups are: 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), Ejército Popular 
Revolucionario (EPR), Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Independiente (ERPI), 
Comando Jaramillista Morelense of 23 May (CJM-23), Ejército Villista 
Revolucionario del Pueblo (EVRP), Comité Clandestino Revolucionario de los 
Pobres Comando Justiciero 28 de Junio (CCRP-CJ), Tendencia Democrática 
Revolucionaria (TDR), Coordinadora Guerrillera Nacional "José María Morelos," 
                                            
174 Michael S. Radu, Dilemmas of Democracy & Dictatorship; Place, Time, and Ideology in 
Global Perspective, (Edison: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 300. 
175 Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy, 148. 
176 Alejandrina Aguirre, "La Guerrilla En Mexico, Hoy [The Guerrilla in Mexico Today]," 
Revista Contenido, Octubre 2007, 69. 
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and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP).177  Of these nine 
groups, the EZLN is the most dynamic because of its innovative tactics of using 
the media to attract public attention and gain both international and domestic 
support. 
a. Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) 
On January 1, 1994, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
(Zapatista Army of National Liberation—EZLN) launched a rebellion in the state 
of Chiapas that coincided with the implementation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The EZLN used the global web to announce their 
plans and ultimately publicized their foot-march into the town of San Cristobal de 
las Casas.  Their clever communicative tactics enabled them to quickly gain 
political status and avoid an overly aggressive military response.  Since then, the 
Zapatistas have engaged in a succession of confrontations with the government, 
the Mexican army, and the local populace in lengthy negotiation processes.  At 
the same time, they have been both subject and sponsor of a range of 
international conferences and information campaigns -- more than any other rural 
insurgency in Latin America.178  As a result, the Zapatista’s manage to 
complicate Mexico’s relationships with much of the Western world with the help 
of special interest groups who seek to take aim at Mexico or attack free trade 
agreements such as NAFTA. 
The Zapatista movement initially caught the Mexican government 
by surprise.  The leader, a charismatic and former professor of communications, 
exploited the information highways to his advantage by provoking a government 
response, yet keeping them in-check by the international audience their info-
                                            
177 Rubén Torres. “Difieren Sedena y PGR sobre presencia de grupos subversivos [Sedena 
and PGR defer about the presence of insurgent groups.” El Economista, [journal online]; available 
from 
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campaign had enveloped.  Once the government recovered from the initial 
surprise, “the Mexican Army mobilized and proceeded to confront the guerrilla 
movement.  After twelve days and 150 casualties, the rebel group was 
completely overpowered by the Army and the violence between the two sides 
ceased.”179  The response by the Mexican government to the violent insurgency 
was constrained by a “dispersed cooperation among the myriad Mexican and 
transnational activists’ non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that support or 
sympathize with the EZLN.”180  The relatively limited offensive capability of the 
EZLN was supported by the global “Information Operations” campaigns which 
eventually forced the government to cease its counteroffensive.  After a ceasefire 
was negotiated, the initial socialist rhetoric of the group was replaced by 
demands for a democracy and a fair civil society, thus earning the title of “armed 
democrats.”181 
The revolutionary Zapatista movement initially centered around the 
ideals of Emiliano Zapata, who led a movement that demanded “tierra y libertad” 
(land and liberty).  As NAFTA started to take away jobs, land, and essentially 
liberty from peasants in rural area, the EZLN increased their stance against 
globalization, which, in-turn, strengthened their national and international support 
from like-minded organizations.  The relationship of the Zapatistas and 
transnational activists was symbiotic in that it helped the Zapatistas to 
disseminate their ideology and demands while spreading the message and 
awareness of anti-globalization civil societies at the international level.182  
Although the EZLN is afforded "virtual" protection from their web-captive  
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audience, the Zapatistas have been very astute political negotiators and have 
strategically avoided giving the Mexican government reasons to take legal or 
military actions against them. 
One of the largest handicaps for the Mexican government in 
countering the Zapatista movement is that neither the military nor the 
governmental has the capability or structure to effectively counter the Information 
Operations campaign of the Zapatista movement.  Instead, the Mexican 
government attempted to co-opt and mollify the Zapatistas by encouraging “them 
to work within the political system, rather than supporting subversive tendencies 
in the country.”183  Even though the Mexican government was aware, at least at 
cabinet level, about the existence of the EZLN eight months prior to the uprising, 
it chose “to talk with the EZLN’s leadership, using Archbishop Samuel Ruíz 
García as the mediator, to prevent an armed rebellion and seek a peaceful 
outcome."184  Another indicator of the government's intentions to settle the 
situation in a peaceful manner was that instead of increasing the level or 
readiness of the Mexican Army for any potential uprising, it “was instructed to 
avoid combat and to collect and provide information to top officials about 
conditions in Chiapas.”185  Ultimately, the strategy of the Mexican government to 
contain and end the insurgency was influenced by Mexico's transition from 
modernity to post modernity -- specifically its membership in NAFTA.  If the 
country had decided to continue fighting the Zapatistas, it would have had 
adverse consequences on the image of the Mexican government and the 
country’s economic power. 
The EZLN is classified as a Marxist-terrorist organization by some 
U.S. intelligence sources.  However, Mexican authorities dismiss them as a 
boisterous peasant movement.  Although this group has yet to carry out violent, 
terrorist-like plots, the existing conditions, and the near-by growing Muslim 
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population, make them vulnerable to Al-Qaeda recruitment or becoming a 
“subcontractor” for terrorist organizations.  Because the members of this group 
are farmers by day and insurgents by night, it is difficult to judge their strength.  
However, during the late 1980s, the EZLN went from 80 to 1,300 combatants, 
and by the early 1990s the rebels had gained a degree of popular support.186 
Although Mexico’s government continues to negotiate for peace, 
they also continue to pursue an aggressive military strategy.  The strategy has 
contained the EZLN to date.  However, the Zapatistas are standing firm in their 
demands.  They still have a great deal of international support as a result of 
waging an aggressive information strategy.  Also, they continue to engage in 
high-profile national political activity resulting in pressure on Mexico City. 
b. Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR) 
Another popular insurgent organization in Mexico is the Ejército 
Popular Revolucionario (People’s Revolutionary Army- EPR).  Since their 
inception in 1996, they have been far more violent than the EZLN and perhaps 
more than any other insurgent group in Mexico.  This group is characterized as a 
Marxist-Leftist organization that instills fear in local populations through acts of 
violence and coercion.  Their goal is for Mexico to become a Socialist 
government.  They are anti-American and anti-capitalist. 
The EPR has had many clashes with the Mexican army and police.  
In 1996 and 1997, the EPR took responsibility for many coordinated attacks that 
resulted in several deaths and the loss of a military plane in Guerrero, Mexico.  
Mexican authorities know that the EPR is well equipped and trained and that they 
are believed to have killed dozens of police and soldiers.  Outwardly, they appear 
to be a well-formed paramilitary organization.  However, inwardly they are a 
networked group of Mexican citizens that take aim at the government’s policies. 
                                            
186 Berger, 339. 
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Although the EPR reached its pinnacle during the late 1990s, they 
have recently made a violent comeback taking responsibility for the bombings of 
several gas pipelines in July and September 2007.  Prior to this, the EPR was 
known for hijacking public transportation vehicles, kidnappings, and other minor 
acts of violence.  The bombings in Guadalajara and Veracruz have cost the 
Mexican government and businesses millions of dollars.  The group warned that 
the violence and explosions would continue if the Mexican government did not 
release two senior EPR members said to be in custody. 
The EPR is not as large as the EZLN.  However, they also protest 
the Mexican government’s repression of political opponents and other dissidents.  
Despite some rhetoric that the EZLN and the EPR have joined forces, there is a 
large disconnect between the two.  The EPR does not have popular support and 
does not engage in information campaigns.  Instead, they rely on brut force 
tactics to instill fear in the local populace, which strong-arms the government to 
listen to their demands.  Their latest form of aggression resembles terrorist 
tactics.  This has caused the Mexican government to respond with the traditional 
mass mobilization of troops.  Nevertheless, these groups continue to cause a 
state of instability in Mexico. 
3. Mexican Government Response 
Upon assuming office, President Felipe Calderon immediately turned to 
the Armed Forces and police for assistance in his campaign against drug 
trafficking and crime organizations.  He focused on law and order matters and 
extradited fifteen criminals to the United States on January 19, 2007.187  The 
increased efforts have gained much praise from the Bush administration.  Still, 
Mexico continues to be the leading transit country for drugs and a leading 
supplier of methamphetamines and marijuana.  The USA Patriot Act  
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Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, enacted in March 2006, includes 
provisions to combat drug smuggling from Mexico.  However, this act relies on 
Mexican authorities to arrest and extradite these individuals. 
The newly elected Mexican administration has directed each state to 
elevate their level of crime fighting by targeting high-crime and drug infested 
areas.  Mexico relies on these conventional ‘anticrime sweeps’ to wage the war 
on drugs and criminal activity throughout the country.  Although the crime 
sweeps are federally mandated, they are state monitored.  Inadequate funding 
has created inconsistencies among states.  The picture below shows which 
states have conducted anticrime sweeps as of September 2007.  Two of the 
most crime ridden and drug infested states, Chiapas and Jalisco, have yet to 
conduct anticrime sweeps. 
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Figure 10.   Mexico’s anticrime sweeps by state. 
From: Executive Office of the President of the United States: "Historic Pressure 
on Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations." Office of National Drug Control 
Policy, October 2007. Available 
http://whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/Publications/sw_border_counternarcotics/Mexico
Slides.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 October 2007. 
 
In summary, Mexico has significantly increased its efforts to counter drug 
trafficking activities, as well as, insurgent and paramilitary groups within the 
country.  Nevertheless, Mexico’s military and law enforcement agencies have not 
established an Information Operations-based capability.  Instead, Mexican 
government agencies communicate with the population primarily through the 
public affairs offices of each department.  While this is a useful means to inform 
the public of government projects and military operations, it does not sufficiently 
strengthen the government’s relationship with the population.  As a result, some 
efforts of government agencies are inadequate, thus overlooking an opportunity 
to positively influence public opinion.  In this regard, information operation 
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principles present a unique prospect to integrate public relations’ capabilities and 
to improve efforts to gain popular support and legitimize the response of the state 
to counter drug traffic and insurgent organizations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the case studies of Colombia and Mexico as 
related to the development of Information Operations capabilities.  These case 
studies identified drug trafficking activities, as well as, insurgent and paramilitary 
groups as the most significant threats to each government.  This chapter 
described the nature of each challenge to better understand the relevance of 
Information Operations.  Although the challenges to the Colombian government 
are multifaceted, the Colombian government has chosen a holistic approach to 
counter these threats. 
The United States has been the most significant ally of the Colombian 
government in its fight against the guerrillas and drug trafficking.  Plan Colombia, 
initially conceived as a strategy to counter drug trafficking, evolved to become the 
dominant strategy to counter the guerrilla and paramilitary threats. 
This chapter described some of the most significant strategies, including 
Information Operations, used by the Colombian government to counter the 
guerrilla and paramilitary threats.  This chapter showed the relevance of 
continuing to solve social demands and grievances to diminish the appeal of 
insurgencies among the population. 
The next chapter will describe how Information Operations can be used by 
the Mexican government and its military forces -- particularly the Mexican Navy -- 
to counter the threats of state.  
 93
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
A. MEXICO’S INDIRECT APPROACH TO INSURGENCIES 
This thesis has defined Information Operations (IO) and investigated its 
use and potential in Latin American countries.  Based on these findings, this 
chapter will focus on Mexico's ability to develop and implement an IO capacity to 
deal with existing and future unconventional threats and insurgencies.  We 
acknowledge that Information Operations by themselves cannot solve the 
different problems that the Mexican military faces in everyday operations.  
Nevertheless, these operations are fundamental tools that can offer significant 
value to the Mexican Armed Forces. 
Although the Mexican military does not currently have an Information 
Operations’ capability, the establishment of such a capability could act as a force 
multiplier in support of current military operations.  Because the Mexican Navy 
has limited jurisdictions, and is held in high regard amongst the population, this is 
a unique opportunity for the Mexican Navy to lead the development of an 
Information Operations’ capability.  The Mexican Navy already operates in a 
multi-dimensional environment -- on sea, air, and land.  For that reason, the 
Mexican Navy can play a vital role in the implementation of a military IO 
capability: it can offer key support to Mexican ground and air forces.  Therefore, 
we use examples from Mexico -- not in naval jurisdictions -- to highlight the 
emerging threats within the country.  Developing an information warfare 
capability could support the wide array of successful operations already 
conducted by the Mexican military. 
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1. Mexico's Current Threat 
Utilizing only conflict and conventional strategies is slowly becoming 
outdated: this is being replaced by technological advances.  This makes warfare 
not only irregular in nature, but, also, makes it accelerate.188  In the information 
age, warfare offers small non-state actors the rights and powers of large-state 
players.  The classic example is the Zapatista movement in Mexico which forced 
the Mexican government and Army to maintain a defensive posture.  It took the 
form of an aggressive and peaceful information campaign that generated 
sympathy and support from international NGOs.189  Clearly, this type of warfare 
equalizes the battlefield and offers huge dividends from relatively small 
investments. 
Information Warfare should be viewed as a non-violent, yet vital tactic of 
future warfare.  The asymmetric battlefield has developed new tactics that reach 
every corner of the globe and, as a result, raises the implications of warfare.  
Therefore, Mexico must be prepared to gain the information initiative to win the 
battle of the ‘story’ and gain popular support. 
Although Mexico is not traditionally known as a terrorist-ridden country, it 
is well known for fostering a century-long internal-revolution.  Furthermore, the 
illegal drug cartels and insurgencies continue to create difficulties for Mexican 
authorities.  The most recent examples of Mexico’s awakened insurgencies are 
evident in the 2006 presidential elections and the 2007 bombings.  On November 
24, 2006, thousands gathered in the Zócalo Square in Mexico City to celebrate 
the unofficial "swearing-in" of the losing candidate and self-proclaimed winner of 
the presidential election, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. (Figure 1)  This clearly 
shows a political divide among the population and is indicative of a revolutionary 
movement in Mexico.  Additionally, in September 2007 the Ejército Popular 
                                            
188 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica: 
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Revolucionario (EPR), an insurgent group that remained silent for nearly 5 years, 
took credit for explosions near petroleum sites in Veracruz and Tlaxcala, 
Mexico.190  These explosions could also be linked to the political turmoil resulting 
from the on-going privatization struggle of the petroleum industry.  Nevertheless, 




Figure 11.   Unofficial swearing-in ceremony of defeated left-wing candidate in 
Mexico's 2006 presidential election, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. 
From: "Mexico's Lopez Obrador 'sworn in'," BBC News, 21 November 2006 
[Website]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6166908.stm; 
Internet; accessed 2 October 2007. 
Because the current situation in Mexico lends itself to insurrections, it is 
important to understand that actors take advantage.  They challenge the stability 
and reformation of the Mexican government.  The EPR uses guerrilla and, most 
recently, terrorist tactics to challenge government policies.  This is accomplished 
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http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/448463.html; Internet; accessed 17 October 2007. 
 96
by spreading fear amongst local populations.  The Mexican drug cartels gained 
relevance in the last decade by facilitating Colombian drug transport and trade 
and, as a result, increasing the criminal activity throughout Mexico.  Finally, the 
EZLN is trying to benefit from Mexico’s current political conditions.  However, the 
EZLN has the cooperation of transnational non-government organizations that 
attract mass media attention and, therefore, attract the Mexican government’s 
attention as well. 
Mexico’s limited success of countering insurgent groups is a result of an 
all-or-nothing response.  Mexico has used either conventional heavy military 
forces or soft diplomatic means of resolution.  Insurgencies have exploited both 
of Mexico’s ‘heavy’ and ‘soft’ responses by adapting and overcoming the 
responses.  In some cases, insurgencies are even outsourcing their work to 
impoverished populations (Chiapas).  This parallels terrorist tactics and links 
terrorism and insurgencies.  Daniel Byman of the Strategic Studies Institute 
argues that there is a tremendous overlap between terrorism and 
insurgencies.191  Therefore, if a government’s response forces an adversary to 
adapt and improvise their strategy, it is imperative to maintain a prepared 
secondary response to deal with unconventional threats. 
How then can the Mexican military, starting with the Navy, implement a 
more efficient and indirect approach to counter future unconventional military 
threats?  How can Mexico counter future insurgents who gain popular support 
using Information Operations?  Can the Mexican military sustain a protracted 
counterinsurgency without losing patience?  If so, would the Mexican government 
approve a low-visibility approach that involves psychological operations directed 
against the population?  Would the population accept such an approach?  Lastly, 
would international actors and NGOs increase or decrease their support of 
Mexico’s insurgencies if they become violent? 
                                            
191 Daniel Byman, "Going to War with the Allies you have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the 
War on Terrorism,” Strategic Studies Institute, (2005): 5. 
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Mexican Naval forces should assume the lead IO responsibility because 
they are already quite competent in their traditional and conventional roles.  They 
suffer little to no recourse from the Mexican population’s distrust of the police and 
military ground forces.  Although the term “psychological operations” sparks 
criticism, the Mexican Navy could rename this activity and exploit information age 
capabilities.192  Thus, using naval psychological operation teams to support and 
influence grand military strategies will increase mission efficiency and counter 
enemy information campaigns. 
The rise of the global media, and the adversaries that use it, also 
transform the way Mexico’s military responds to insurgencies.  One of the most 
profound features that made the EZLN so successful was their use of 
postmodern insurgent, or “net war,” tactics.  What distinguished the Zapatistas 
from other 20th century rebels was their use of NGOs and their aggressive 
information campaigns.  Many people thought that the rebels in Chiapas were 
part of the old Sandanista-Marxist-Leninist groups.  However, what they received 
was quite the opposite: the first post-communist rebellion in Latin America.193  
For this reason, Mexico should develop a strategy to deal with post-modern 
threats.  Such strategies should emphasize working either directly or indirectly 
with local populations while fostering relations and building on the capacity to 
conduct effective operations against existing and future enemies.  The current 
strategies that Mexico’s military uses to deal with insurgencies are derived from a 
conventional doctrine and are perhaps inadequate to counter insurgencies.  It is 
possible that the strategies used by Mexico should, therefore, be tailored to fit the 
threat.  Perhaps a politically acceptable, low-visibility approach, using 
psychological and information-based concepts to support primary missions, 
would achieve results that are more effective. 
                                            
192 Allison Batdorff, "Field Marketing in Fallujah; PSYOP teams build trust with patience, 
determination," Stars and Stripes, 28 September 2007, Mideast edition, 4. 
193 Carlos Fuentes, “Chiapas: Latin America’s First Post Communist Rebellion,” New 
Perspectives Quarterly 11, (1994): 56. 
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For many reasons, the information strategy used by the EZLN remains 
classic.  One of the leading organizers of the EZLN and a charismatic 
spokesperson is Subcomandante Marcos.  A university educated, middle-class 
“westernized” Mexican who recognized the existence of poverty and social 
injustices in Chiapas was transformed into a mythical legend by Mexican media 
outlets.  Although Marcos claimed to be one of many, the information age 
immortalized him and aroused mass support for him and his cause.  The same 
has happened with Mexican drug cartel leaders who parallel the drug lord icons 
of Colombia.  Creating such mysticism could invite copycat actors.  If not careful, 
the skills, tactics, and resources of other global insurgencies will transcend onto 
Mexico’s growing insurgencies.  This would greatly increase threats by 
combining forces to achieve greater results.  Therefore, developing government 
capacities to confront these emerging adversaries is drastically important to 
counter Mexico's threats. 
Central and Southern Mexico are typically the areas of most resistance 
and, thus, most ripe for insurgent influences.  The state of Chiapas, well known 
for its peasant movements, is the home of the EZLN.  The Lacandon Jungle 
offers plenty of rural seclusion for insurgent populations.  Chiapas is also known 
for restoring Mexico’s traditional, cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity.  The 
rural geography and the traditional framework result in a loosely governed region.  
As a result of NAFTA, the majority of the population has an income below the 
poverty line and many jobs have been eliminated.  Furthermore, Chiapas has 
become the home to a growing Muslim population in a predominately-Catholic 
country.194  As of 2000, there were over 257,000 Muslims residing in Mexico, 
mostly in Chiapas.195  The city of San Cristóbal de Las Casas in Chiapas has 
one of the largest Muslim populations in Latin America and the number of 
                                            
194 Natascha Garvin, "Conversion and Conflict; Muslims in Mexico." ISIM Review 15, 2005. 
[journal online]; available from http://www.isim.nl/files/Review_15/Review_15-18.pdf; Internet; 
accessed 25 September 2007. 
195 Muslim Population Worldwide, "Muslim Population in Mexico," [web site]; available from 
http://www.islamicpopulation.com/Mexico-Central.html; Internet; accessed 29 September 2007. 
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Mosques continues to grow each year.196  Some claim that Islam is gaining a 
stronghold in this volatile area of Mexico through converting hundreds of 
indigenous Mayans.197  Should the Mexican government be worried about a 
culture clash or an Islamic movement in its own country?  Could this worry be 
enough to leverage U.S. support?  These types of areas are what Sean 
Anderson defines as “grey areas.”198  He describes these grey areas as 
ungovernable regions in developing nations over which unstable national 
governments have nominal control.  The lack of control allows criminals, 
terrorists, and insurgents excellent bases of operation from which they can 
conduct far-reaching effects on their targets. 
 
Figure 12.   Map of Southern Mexico, depicting grey area. 
From: "Country Maps: Mexico (Political) 1997." Perry-Castañeda Library Map 
Collection, University of Texas Libraries, [Web site]; available from 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/mexico_pol97.jpg; Internet; accessed 
10 October 2007. 
                                            
196 Garvin, "Conversion and Conflict; Muslims in Mexico." 
197 Jens Glüsing, "Islam is gaining a foothold in Chiapas," Spiegel Online International, 28 
May 2005 [journal online]; available from 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,358223,00.html; Internet; accessed 1 October 
2007. 
198 Sean K. Anderson, "U.S. Counterinsurgency vs. Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism," Low 
Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, 2002 [journal online]; available from 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content?content=10.1080/0966284042000279027; Internet; 
accessed 8 October 2007, 85. 
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Mexico’s grey areas are notorious for civil unrest, insurgent and criminal 
activity and, most recently, Muslim conversions.  Mexico can properly intervene 
against these suspect activities using unconventional methods to prevent an 
insurgent or terrorist safe haven from developing.  Since the events of 
September 11, 2001, the U.S. considers Mexico the front line in the war on terror.  
Mexico could use this to leverage U.S. support in these grey regions by 
implementing an unconventional or psychological strategy. 
2. Mexico's Diamond 
Mexico’s unconventional and indirect approach must be fair, remain 
consistent, and strive to gain popular support.  The Mexican government is often 
criticized for exercising its authority via its ground forces and, as a result, has 
generated a certain anti-Army sentiment amongst some Mexican populations.  
Therefore, any future military strategy must be carefully planned and executed to 
lessen the distance between the populations and discourage any opposition.  
Although the Mexican Navy has traditionally been more successful than the 
ground forces at staying out of the political limelight, it would be wise to use the 
Navy to develop such strategy and share it with its military counterparts. 
Gordon McCormick’s “mystic diamond,” as previously defined in this 
thesis, is a model that could help planners organize and devise a 
counterinsurgency strategy.  Such strategy could be aimed at Mexico’s recurring 
unconventional threats and integrate both psychological and information warfare 
tactics.  This strategy could be used to cut off adversaries from their bases of 
popular support.  McCormick’s diamond offers a comprehensive framework for 
interactions between local populations, host-nation governments, insurgencies, 
and international actors (Figure 13).  Both the host-nation and the insurgent’s 
goal is to gain popular support and use it as leverage against the other.  Once 
popular support is established, each side can persuade international and non-
government actors to side with them.  This increases the likelihood of victory.  
The host-nation government’s goal is to destroy the insurgents or limit their 
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growth and influence.  The insurgent’s goal, with popular support, is to grow large 
enough to overpower the host-nation’s control mechanisms to either overthrow 
the government or force it to meet their objectives.  The EZLN gained political 
status using post-modern information warfare tactics so they could negotiate 
better conditions for the impoverished rural populations.  The EPR demanded 
media attention using terrorist tactics and spread fear among the local populace.  
In accordance with McCormick’s counterinsurgency model, both adversary 
groups achieved their initial objectives by winning over, or coercing, the local 
population.  If Mexico's Navy could implement the mystic diamond within its 
jurisdictions, it could intervene with future adversaries from gaining popular 
support. 
 
Figure 13.   McCormick's model of insurgency applied to Mexico. 
After: Gordon H. McCormick, Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare Lecture Notes, 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Summer Quarter 2006). 
 
For Mexico to develop an effective counterinsurgent strategy, it must 
recognize its strengths and weaknesses as they relate to the insurgents.  
Mexico’s authority and military might far exceeds that of the insurgents.  
However, insurgencies have been able to elude capture and maintain the 
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information advantage.  The insurgents have networks spread amongst the local 
populations which enable them to gain the popular support much easier than the 
government.  Furthermore, most insurgents in Mexico have “day jobs,” in which 
they are farmers by day and insurgents by night, making them very difficult to 
detect and target. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Principles of McCormick's Diamond. 
From: Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-
PHILIPPINES and The Indirect Approach,” Military Review [journal online]; 1 





accessed 8 October 2007. 
 
Mexico’s counterinsurgency strategy should therefore include information 
campaigns to appeal to and enlist the participation of the local populace.  Such 
information campaigns strategically plan to not only outwardly appeal to the 
public, but, also, to have psychological effects that influence the people.  Both 
help authorities against insurgencies.  It is vital to have a strategy that is not 
counter productive to unconventional threats. 
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An example that lingers in the minds of the Mexican population is the 
events of Tlatelolco in 1968.  As Mexico City prepared to host the Summer 
Olympics of 1968, political and social unrest stirred amongst the population.  This 
fueled student movements against the Mexican government’s repression.  As 
tensions grew, civil demonstrations quickly turned into civil unrest.  The Mexican 
government used violent force to quell the student-led civil disturbance.  As a 
result, some Mexican citizens lost confidence and continue to be afraid of military 
ground and police forces.  Because of their historical significance to civil-military 
relations, the events of Tlatelolco are sometimes compared to China’s 
Tiananmen Square and to the U.S.’s Kent State riots.  Much like the Zapatista 
(EZLN) movement, led by Subcomandante Marcos, which used modern mass 
media to spread their rhetoric, the students of Universidad Nacional Autónoma 
de Mexico (UNAM) also used this tactic to exploit their disgust of the Mexican 
government: they used the Olympic-staged media to spread their rhetoric.  The 
timing of Tlatelolco caused political stress.  To prevent the nation’s 
embarrassment, the top-level decision makers pushed to quell student 
demonstrators.  Unfortunately, this action perhaps precipitated a trigger-happy 
response.  If so, this undoubtedly led to an exaggerated government response 
and, perhaps, over-zealous military and police force actions.  The already tense 
relationship between the government and students was agitated further.  The 
increase in political violence and government repression unified not only students 
from various campuses, but, also, workers and local activists from Mexico City.  
This confirmed the idea that sometimes a government’s response can lead to 
unintended and counter productive consequences.  The situation in Tlatelolco 
began as a simple student demonstration; however, the heavy government 
response ignited an unconventional response: it created, for some sectors of 
Mexico’s population, a false sense of confidence and fear of uniformed forces. 
Using McCormick’s counterinsurgency model to develop a strategy to deal 
with future unconventional threats, such as those of Tlatelolco and the EZLN, is 
necessary for Mexico.  Such a strategy needs an information warfare component 
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that can be deployed in conjunction with ground-based, or other kinetic 
operations, when tensions start to build.  McCormick’s diamond demonstrates 
how states vie for popular support by focusing on the people’s needs and 
security to counter the insurgent’s advantage.  Information tactics could aim at 
swaying public opinion; simultaneously, police, or other local authorities, could 
make the people feel safe.  Once public support is gained, it would be much 
harder for insurgencies to ask for international or NGO support.  This would 
make it extremely difficult to overpower the state. 
Since time is typically on the insurgent’s side, this usually gives them the 
information advantage as well.  The diamond model establishes specific tasks: 
some to counter the insurgent’s goal of maximizing itself to overpower the state; 
others to optimize the state’s security apparatus to overcome the information 
disadvantage.  The diamond model depicts how both the state and counter state 
compete for popular support (the internal environment).  The external 
environment is made up of international and non-governmental actors that can 
support either the state -- thru diplomacy -- or the counter state -- thru media, 
finances, and other means.  Both internal and external environments require an 
unconventional strategy and indirect approach. 
To establish the conditions for Information Operations to exploit, the 
Mexican military's indirect strategy should also include both psychological 
operations and civil affairs teams.  These teams are vital in gathering detailed 
assessments and human intelligence directly from the source.  In Mexico, gaining 
popular support is a zero-sum game in which one’s gain is the other’s loss.  
Since the initial phase of an insurgency is the best time for a government to 
counter it, determining the underlying conditions that make the environment ripe 
for insurgent activity is extremely important.  The teams could also analyze socio-
economic and education conditions critical in gaining popular support and 
countering an insurgency.  Therefore, Mexico’s objective should be to strengthen 
its government and military relationships with the population to overcome the 
information disadvantage, increase the security in volatile regions, and convert 
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human intelligence into actionable intelligence.  This overall strategy would 
reduce the Mexican military’s rising unconventional threats by encouraging local 
involvement -- rather than previous strategies, which alienated the people. 
The success of this strategy is defined by many factors.  All factors have 
led to an increased security state, host-nation legitimacy and control of a volatile 
region, and to denying insurgents and terrorists a safe haven in targeted 
geographical areas.  As the security situation improves, the Mexican government 
could continue such strategy by developing the volatile regions.  This could be 
accomplished by hiring the local populous and using local resources to create a 
psychological “teaming” effect, thus, winning over the population.  Humanitarian 
and civic aid projects, such as construction of water wells, improvement of roads, 
public transportation, land distribution, and an educational system, would greatly 
benefit the local populace.  These types of projects earn the respect of the local 
population, thus, improve the image of the Mexican military.  This enables the 
military to, first, gain the popular support and, second, counter the insurgent 
threats.  Working with the local populace, while strengthening local authorities, 
fosters civil-military relations, establishes the conditions for peace and 
stabilization, and provides a favorable impression of Mexican military efforts.  
Thus, this also creates a positive information campaign. 
Using Information Operations in a manner that informs citizens of the 
negative effects of insurgencies and facilitates methods of reporting criminal 
activity to local security forces without fear of repercussions is essential.  
Information Operations maximize public awareness which can create a ‘local’ 
information network.  Soon, people begin to experience better living conditions 
and become comfortable to share information with authorities.  Eventually, they 
begin to withdraw their support from the insurgencies.  These actions indirectly, 
yet positively, affect Mexico's ability to win over local populations. 
Therefore, the Mexican Navy should take the lead in deriving a 
counterinsurgency strategy that encompasses information campaigns that attract 
popular support.  Since they often neglect populations, or use excessive force to 
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quell civil disturbances and non-violent insurgent activity, current Mexican military 
operations are perhaps counter-productive.  This type of over-reaction fuels 
tensions and creates conditions that are conducive to insurgent growth or, worse, 
breeds new extremist and terrorist organizations.  Using the indirect strategy 
described in this thesis to counter insurgencies in Mexico can create a favorable 
impression of the Mexican government.  This unconventional strategy is much 
more politically acceptable than an overzealous military response.  Using local 
security forces as part of the solution demonstrates Mexico's commitment to work 
with the local populace to achieve peace and stabilization in its jurisdictional 
regions.  A modern information and psychological warfare strategy can 
compliment and inform military operations to counter future unconventional 
threats.  This must start with the Mexican Navy. 
3. Information Operations Benefits for the Mexican Navy 
Using Mexico's Navy to develop and implement an adequate Information 
Operations' capability would enhance and support the Mexican military's existing 
capabilities.  Adequate Information Operations would create the following 
substantial benefits for the Mexican Navy: 
a. Protecting Strategic Installations in the Sound of 
Campeche in the Southern Gulf of Mexico 
In 2006, PEMEX [the state-owned oil and gas company, Petróleos 
Mexicanos] had 199 offshore platforms.199  After the attacks against the United 
States on September 11, 2001, the Mexican Navy implemented Operación 
Sonda [Operation Sound] to protect the oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.  This 
reinforced the surveillance that already existed in the area with additional ships, 
                                            
199 Petróleos Mexicanos. "PEMEX Anuario Estadístico 2007." PEMEX, [web site]; available 
from http://www.pemex.com.mx/files/dcf/AEPep07.pdf; Internet; accessed 13 August 2007, 11. 
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high speed interceptor crafts, helicopters, and surveillance aircraft.200  The 
Mexican Navy has always worked in close coordination with the United States 
Coast Guard to protect this area effectively.  One of the first reactions was to 
establish a security area around the Sound of Campeche, located within the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, to restrict, monitor, and control maritime and aerial 
navigation.  The Mexican Navy's operations in this area protect the country's 
strategic and vital oil installations.  Therefore, the Mexican Navy can skillfully use 
Information Operations to support these operations by making the local 
population aware of the complexities and implications of the critical oil 
infrastructure.  While the operations of the Mexican Navy are intended to guard 
the strategic economic assets of the country, they also protect the lives of the 
platform workers.  Also, they maintain a positive marine environment.  
Information Operations can help the Mexican Navy to take appropriate measures 
to gain and strengthen their popular support in costal regions, such as Tabasco 
and Veracruz, where a significant part of the platforms' workers originate.  
Increased support and trust of the population can influence intelligence collection 
capabilities.  This offers better insight into the issues that most effect the 
population within its jurisdictions. 
b. Applying the Rule of Law within Mexican Maritime 
Spaces 
Mexican Navy Oceanic Patrols operate at a hi-operational tempo to 
enforce the rule of law in the Territorial Sea and in the Exclusive Economic Zone.  
As a result, the Mexican Navy is constantly seeking to maximize its forces to 
accomplish its missions.  These include, but are not limited to, drug trafficking 
and fisheries enforcement.  To optimize these resources and to accomplish its 
missions, the Mexican Navy works closely with the U.S. Department of 
                                            
200 Jesús Aranda and others, “Se redobla la vigilancia en ambas fronteras e instalaciones de 
PEMEX [surveillance increased in both borders and PEMEX facilities],” La Jornada (Mexico City), 
20 March 2003, [journal online]; available from 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2003/03/20/018n1pol.php?ori-gen=politica.html; Internet; accessed 
27 July 2006. 
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Homeland Security -- particularly with the Coast Guard.  Coordinating with 
multiple agencies has made the Mexican Navy's operations within the country's 
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone more efficient.  Information 
Operations could very well be used by the Mexican Navy to compliment its law 
enforcement operations.  By using information operation campaigns, the Mexican 
Navy can strengthen its working relationship with those in the maritime career 
field.  By doing so, the Mexican Navy can gain useful allies and encourage 
information about potential illicit activities in the maritime domain.  Information 
Operations could also inform the population about the consequences of 
operating outside the law -- particularly those involved with insurgent or drug-
related activities.  It is essential to highlight that since the Mexican Navy operates 
under the premises of protecting human lives and respecting human rights, 
publicizing this in an information campaign could increase its influence among 
the population.  It could also increase the population’s confidence in the 
institution. 
c. Interdicting Drug Trafficking and Production Activities 
As the Mexican Navy increases its counter drug trafficking 
operations, it faces criticism from media and certain sectors of the population.  
An Information Operations’ campaign could help keep the media on edge and 
maintain good community relations with local populations.  It could also increase 
intelligence collection and gain valuable sources.  The largest cocaine shipment 
ever seized in Mexico was over 23.5 tons of cocaine.  It was seized by a joint 
taskforce of Mexican authorities who were acting on an intelligence-based 
lead.201  Popular approval and confidence of the Mexican Navy constitutes an  
 
 
                                            
201 For more information about the Mexican authorities involved seizing this cocaine 
shipment, see: Secretaría de Marina [Secretariat of the Navy], “Comunicado de prensa [Press 
release] 151/07,” 1 November 2007 [web site]; available from 
http://semar.gob.mx/boletin/2007/bol_151_07.htm; Internet; accessed 8 November 2007. 
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important asset for the Navy's intelligence based operations.  Information 
Operations, when properly used, can contribute significantly to building 
confidence among the population. 
In summary, the Mexican Navy's operations successfully integrate 
its sea, air, and land components for the accomplishment of its missions.  
However, the Mexican Navy can further Mexico's military objectives by 
developing an Information Operations’ capability to share with its counterparts.  
These principles would act as force multipliers, building on the existing influence 
of the Navy's operations among the population, and would improve the military's 
public perception.  Although Information Operations cannot win the battle by 
themselves, they can add great value to successful military operations. 
B. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis demonstrates that, in this era of global communications, the 
Mexican military must carefully plan its response to insurgencies so that they are 
not counter-productive.  Therefore, it must develop alternate and unconventional 
remedies to preserve its sea, air, and land security.  Such strategy would require 
investigative analysis to determine the root causes of illicit activities.  Current 
military strategies rely heavily on the mass mobilization of ground troops.  
However, an IO capability would enhance the effects of such mobilization.  For 
example, in response to the attacks on the gas pipelines in July 2007, the 
Mexican Secretary of Defense ordered the mobilization of 5,000 troops.202  This 
mass ground movement could have been greatly supplemented by a Navy-led IO 
campaign to inform and prepare near-by populations.  This would have resulted 
in better results. 
Mexico’s conventional responses have had limited success in defeating 
insurgent groups.  In some cases, they have damaged the image of its public 
security and military institutions.  As in the cases of the EZLN and the EPR, the 
                                            
202 Aguirre, "La Guerrilla En Mexico, Hoy [The Guerrilla in Mexico Today]," 38-39. 
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Mexican military and police have lacked appropriate tactical intelligence prior to 
the ambushes and offensive operations.  This suggests an insufficient 
intelligence structure and reveals the inability to not only to reach out to 
populations, but to learn from decades of prior counterinsurgency operations 
elsewhere -- from Vietnam to El Salvador.203 
It is evident that the Mexican government's response was constrained by 
external factors.  Therefore, the need for its armed forces to develop an 
Information Operations’ capability is crucial.  The Mexican Armed Forces, 
particularly the Mexican Navy, needs to establish Information Operations’ 
capability to optimize the use of its resources in countering future unconventional 
threats. 
The Colombian government, specifically the Colombian military, has used 
Information Operations to support its fight against the counter state to win the 
hearts and minds of the population.  The decision to adopt this strategy was 
made long after the Colombian government had been engaged in fighting the 
counter state using a kinetic approach.  The present strategy of President Álvaro 
Uribe in not focused on the military kinetic approach, but, rather, on a broader set 
of policies and reforms destined to address the origins of the problems.  Although 
the conflict amongst the state, insurgents, and paramilitaries is far from over, the 
use of Information Operations has significantly contributed to legitimize the state 
in the eyes of the population.  Acting according to the law, while emphasizing 
respect for human rights, the Colombian military gained the necessary advantage 
to legitimize the response of the state in its fight against the insurgents and 
paramilitaries.  Despite the internal conflict, it is important to highlight that most of 
the population is in favor of the armed forces and the national police and willfully 
rejects the insurgents and their causes.  The use of Information Operations also 
supported efforts by the Colombian state to solve social problems and 
grievances.  This diminishes the appeal of the insurgencies. 
                                            
203 Radu, Dilemmas of Democracy & Dictatorship; Place, Time, and Ideology in Global 
Perspective, 300-301. 
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Furthermore, this thesis presented Mexico's most significant challenges -- 
particularly those related to insurgencies and drugs.  In this regard, the response 
of the Mexican government is conventionally framed: using the authority of its 
armed forces to respond to the counter state. 
If Mexico were to adopt McCormick's model of counterinsurgency, it may 
experience some of the successes seen in Colombia.  The model developed by 
the Colombian military to counteract the threat of the counter state has been 
successful, in part, to their use of combining Information Operations with ground 
operations.  The Mexican military could use its Navy to support a similar model 
that could enhance current effectiveness in the maritime, air, and ground 
domains.  The Mexican Navy is already well trained to avoid escalating situations 
and has a high regard for human rights.  This type of training, combined with 
Information Operations, can lead to an improved military strategy for countering 
Mexico's current and future threats. 
The fact that the Mexican Navy is not stigmatized by a poor public image, 
presents the unique possibility of establishing Mexico's Information Operations’ 
capability without the risk of causing public commotion.  Developing an 
Information Operations’ capability would allow the Mexican Navy to support all 
military operations.  It would influence public opinion to support government 
actions, preserve tranquility, and ensure stability during crises. 
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